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ABSTRACT  
The recent as well as precedent market crashes has increased a number of already existing biases when 
estimating a forward looking cost of capital for company’s stakeholders. With cost of capital being 
essential in corporate valuation and decision making the following paper analyzes the research carried 
out by numerous academics up to date and provides a comprehensive overview on the appropriate 
choices of inputs and methods for estimating cost of capital. The paper draws the necessary attention to 
the times of crises. An additional study shows how different preferences can result in variation in cost of 
equity capital and terminal value of a company. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The following paper provides a comprehensive overview of the major debates over estimating the 
inputs for cost of capital used in the enterprise valuation and corporate valuation. Hundreds of research 
academics and practitioners over the recent decades have argued concerning methodology used for 
estimating every single variable in cost of capital. These debates not only made the choices for 
estimating cost of capital a complex subject, but combined with constantly evolving market 
characteristics they have made cost of capital and valuation an art.  
So far most of practitioners have chosen methods that have been framed by major services, simplicity, 
data availability, common sense and overall consensus. This paper tries to factor in all of that, in 
addition, providing a critical opinion at some instances and incorporating major considerations relevant 
to using cost of capital in the distressed environment. 
The objective of the paper is to overview and to compare different methods proposed by various 
authors and services for estimating elements of cost of capital. The paper aims to analyze as well as 
conform with or refute widely accepted choices in cost of capital calculations. In the concluding case 
study we question how the choices of methods lead to varying estimates of cost of equity capital and 
how that impacts the value of a company.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides brief outlook on the importance of cost of capital 
in the corporate decisions making and its impact on the value of the company. Section 3 continues by 
discussing the main inputs used in cost of equity capital calculations with a particular focus on the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model. We discuss the implications of using different proxies for risk-free rate, 
market portfolio, beta estimation methodologies and adjustments as well as separate considerations to 
be noted when using cost of capital in the distressed environment. These mainly include market 
distortions, treatment of tax shields and positive debt betas. Section 4 extends discussion on cost of 
equity by looking at the recent research carried out on equity risk premiums. Here we also analyze the 
failure of the CAPM and provide with our point of view on applying additional risk premiums suggested 
by various authors. Section 5 provides with considerations related to estimating after-tax cost of debt, 
with a focus on synthetic ratings and marginal tax rates. Section 6 puts together the elements of cost of 
capital, presents a classical framework for Weighted Average of Cost of Capital and provides with the 
main caveats surrounding capital weights. We end our discussion with a case study in Section 7 where 
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we illustrate a variety of choices discussed in the previous sections and their impact on cost of equity 
estimation for Kraft Foods. 
Finally, we conclude the paper with the summary and our recommendations on the preferred inputs 
and methods for estimating cost of capital as well as areas of further research. 
2 COST OF CAPITAL OVERVIEW 
 
Cost of capital is central to corporate decision making and valuation. Reducing cost of financing is a 
fundamental determinant of the value creation as much as freeing cash-flows and sustaining healthy 
growth rates. It enters one of the most vital performance measurements employed by management and 
analysts, an economic value added. Perhaps one of the simplest ways to illustrate that is the notion of 
economic profit which measures value created by a company over time: 
Economic Profit = Invested Capital x (ROIC 1– WACC) 
As you can see positive or negative economic profit that adds or destroys value in any single period is 
essentially defined by the spread between return on invested capital and cost of capital2. In any single 
period that cost of capital exceeds return on invested capital, negative economic profit will reduce the 
value of company.  
Cost of capital also enters key value driver formulas or for those who are familiar more, a well-
established cash-flow perpetuity formula used to present simple pro-forma constant growth valuation 
framework: 
           (2.1) 
where: 
FCF – free cash flows to equity 
WACC – weighted average of cost of capital 
g – growth rate 
                                                          
1
 ROIC (Return on Invested Capital) – return earned on every invested dollar in the company, on all capital or on 
marginal capital. 
2
 When we talk about cost of capital we usually refer to weighted average cost of capital, an average required 
return of all investors participating in the financing of a company. Terms such as cost of capital, WACC, required 
rate of return or discount rate are used interchangeably. 
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Key value driver formulas are more than often used in DCF Enterprise Valuation method by practitioners 
to come up with the terminate value of a company. This term accounts for a chunky part of the total 
present value of a company and is extremely sensitive to the estimations of cost of capital. 
As a result, understanding WACC is central for both corporate decision making as well as valuation. 
As a final remark, we would like to point out that cost of capital should only take into consideration 
returns required by investors on securities held in the company. To avoid double counting, it should not 
gauge operating liabilities such as cost of financing that are already captured in the free cash flows. 
Finally, it should be based on the market value of the assets this way allowing it to reflect expectations 
of the investors. 
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3 COST OF EQUITY: CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL 
Before we begin the discussion on more debatable issues on estimation of cost of capital, we would first 
like to give a comprehensive overview on asset pricing model that has gained widest acceptance over 
the years by both academics and practitioners – the capital asset pricing model. 
Basic CAPM gives a well founded linear relationship between risk and return that is easy to grasp as well 
as adjust to company-specific risk characteristics. As most of the readers are well aware of, simple CAPM 
provides an expected return defined as a risk premium over a riskless rate. The risk premium is adjusted 
by the factor β – henceforth “beta” - that captures subject firm’s relative operating and financial 
leverage as well as business cyclicality. 
           (3.1) 
where: 
 – expected return on any asset 
 – beta  
 – market risk premium  
 – riskless rate of return 
 
Given the relationship, CAPM shows compensation on an asset required by investors if they added the 
asset to a well diversified portfolio, hence CAPM measures market risk only.  
In the current chapter we will provide a comprehensive overview and the related debates on the 
elements of the capital asset pricing model used to estimate cost of equity. 
3.1 RISK-FREE RATE  
 
To estimate risk-free rate practitioners typically use government bonds that best match forecast period 
of the cash flows. Government bonds are assumed to be risk-free under assumption that government 
will always be able to meet the payments – at least in nominal terms - by printing more currency. As a 
result, returns on such security has no covariance with the market as represented by zero beta in the 
CAPM.  W
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Ideally, each forecasted cashflow should be discounted using yield of a bond whose duration coincides 
with the duration of the forecasted cashflows3. Term structure of interest rates is rarely flat and using 
single bond yield to discount cashflows in different periods might slightly understate of overstate 
required return on equity. However, as suggested by Damodaran, if long-term rates are higher no more 
than 2-3%, there should be insignificant effect on the present value of a company. Should that not hold, 
one should work his way through to match different yields with the respective cash flows for more 
precision. 
Most valuation practitioners approximate that and for the sake of simplicity employ long-term 
government bonds, such as US-treasury bonds or German bunds, whose characteristics allow for low 
credit risk, high liquidity as well as help them match the maturity and the forecast period best. They use 
zero coupon bonds or STRIPS4 since they do not make any interim payments, therefore imply no 
reinvestment risk and prevent from shorter effective time to maturity. Having said all that, a widely 
accepted choice of preference is a 10-year zero. Longer maturity than that, such as one of 30 year bonds 
might match the cash flows better (especially bearing in mind that most investments in companies 
exhibit reinvestment risk that is also common in long term government bonds). However, it would likely 
require us to account for illiquidity on such bonds, while shorter maturity, such as one of t-bills would 
understate risk-free rate given the fact that the yield curve is mostly upward sloping as suggested 
before. Furthermore, short-term rates are more volatile and susceptible to central bank actions and 
therefore might warp valuation. In corporate investment analysis, on the other hand, shorter maturities 
can be used should the duration of project’s cash flows be less than 10 years. 
Choosing risk free rate also has important implications for risk premiums. Should an analyst apply 
historical market risk premiums they should be calculated over the same maturities as the risk-free 
proxy used in deriving required return on equity. Thus, if we use yields on 10 year bonds as a risk-free 
proxy, we should calculate historical stock market premium in excess of 10 year bond as well. As word 
caution, Morningstar/Ibbotson Associates which provide data service for equity risk premia estimate 
long-term premium over 20-year bonds. If an analyst decides to use these data service market 
premiums, she should use the 20-year government bond yields as a risk-free rate accordingly. 
                                                          
3
 , where D – duration, T-number of cashflow periods, C – cashflow and i – required yield 
4
 “Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities (STRIPS) program that allows US investors to 
trade coupon payments and the principal of treasuries separately.  
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Finally, risk free proxy should be consistent with the cash flows. Should the growth include inflationary 
effect, i.e. cash flows stated in nominal terms, the risk free rate should also be stated in nominal terms5.  
Moreover, the bond that is used in deducing risk free rate should be denominated in the same currency 
as the cash flows. Damodaran (2007) proposes that given the purchasing power parity, one could 
theoretically value a foreign company in local currency using local bond yields. However, it is not really 
used in practice. Perhaps a reason for that is that foreign exchange rates and interest rates as well as 
inflationary processes rarely follow parities as they are described in economic textbooks6 and given the 
noise that exists in foreign exchange markets that would distort valuation. 
All in all, we believe that the choice for risk-free rate should firstly be consistent with the market risk 
premium used. However, we believe that 10-year government bonds fit the notion of risk-free rate best 
for the valuation purposes. 
3.2 BETA ESTIMATION 
Most conventional way of finding CAPM’s beta is through the means of statistical regression using 
historical data. Beta of an asset measures how much it comoves with the market. In essence, it shows 
how many times a stock amplifies the movements of the market. Beta is obtained by regressing total 
returns of a company on total returns of a market portfolio. Though it practically makes no difference, 
few data service providers such as Morningstar regress excess returns instead of total returns. 
           (3.2) 
where: 
 – stock return 
 –  beta of stock 
 –  market return 
 – excess return 
 – error term 
 
 
   
 
                                                          
5
 Exceptional case is when we are valuing companies that operate in countries of unpredictable hyperinflation. We 
might then want to project cash-flows and estimate cost of capital and related inputs in real terms. 
6
 See Sarno, L. (2005). Viewpoint: Towards a Solution to the Puzzles in Exchange Rate Economics: Where do we 
Stand?, Canadian Journal of Economics 38(3): 673 – 708 
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FIGURE 3.1: REGRESSION BETA 
 
Since market risk premium and risk free rate are constant throughout the market in any single period, 
beta is the sole driver of stock returns in the original CAPM framework. As a result, it is crucial to 
understand the caveats of the main methods and considerations used to estimate beta in practice. 
Main issues related to estimating betas turn around sample size of returns, frequency of returns, choice 
of proxy for market portfolio, methods used to make forward looking adjustments, i.e. smoothing 
techniques of betas. 
Sample size of returns has no accepted standards since large data service providers use different 
measurement periods. Bloomberg, for instance, calculates raw beta based on weekly return sample of 2 
years. Other data providers such as Standard & Poor’s or Morningstar use 5 year period based on 
monthly returns (see Appendix for more details). Longer period allows for smaller standard error in the 
regression, but it exposes the results to biases resulting from changing risk characteristics of a company. 
Using longer period might undermine recent changes in business mix or capital structure, common for 
emerging firms or periods of corporate restructuring. 
R² = 0,249
y = 0,422x - 0,001
-20,00%
-15,00%
-10,00%
-5,00%
0,00%
5,00%
10,00%
15,00%
-30,00% -20,00% -10,00% 0,00% 10,00% 20,00%
Return on 
Market %
Return on Kraft Foods %
OLS Best Fit Line
W
ith
dra
wn
 by
 t
e a
uth
or
11 
 
Studies of the CAPM in the 70s and 80s showed that sample periods of monthly data of around 5 years 
give the most unbiased results.7 
 There are exceptions to the rules as one might expect. One is that of extreme market re-pricing.  
A study carried out by McKinsey8 shows that dot-com bubble generated artificially low betas for more 
mature industries. Before the surge in tech stock prices, mature industries represented significant 
portion of the U.S. market cap. After the tech surge, instead U.S. market became heavily weighted on 
tech stocks that drove returns for U.S. indices (see next page). These returns were uncorrelated with 
mature industries and biased the betas of these industries downwards. The results pertained several 
years after the burst as beta estimates are based on a look-back period. Indeed, the same has happened 
during the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis when highly leveraged companies and financials were 
driving the U.S. market down. Companies that had low leverage saw their betas diminish with respect to 
S&P500 as their returns were less correlated with the market than before. It might be useful to check 
the structural changes in the market in advance. 
To inspect beta estimates for deviations, one can build a time series analysis by rolling a 5 year beta 
sample period of monthly data as done in classical studies of Fama&French9 or simply by plotting index 
returns against company returns. This consequently should allow us to examine the changes in beta as 
well as the underlying corporate or market factors that would otherwise be covered by outdated returns 
that can potentially dominate the sample as portrayed by the low R^2 and low historical beta  of Kraft 
Foods in 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Black, Scholes and Jensen (1972), “The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some Empirical Tests” 
   Alexander and Chervany (1980), “On the Estimation and Stability of Beta” 
8
 Annema and Goedhart, “Better Betas”, McKinsey on Finance (Winter 2003) 
9
 See Fama and MacBeth (1973), “Risk return and equilibrium empirical tests”, Journal of Political Economy 81 
(1973), pp. 607–636; Fama and French (1992), “The cross section of expected stock returns” 
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FIGURE 3.2: TIME SERIES OF ROLLING BETA 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Datastream. 
Should one find that turbulence in the markets over the 5 year sample make beta estimates misleading 
for the future, it would be reasonable to reduce the sample size to 12 months while increasing the 
frequency of returns. If there is a consensus that the last 12 months represent a forward looking 
equilibrium prices better than 5 years, beta estimates based and 1 year observation will give more 
precise results.  
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 FIGURE 3.3: PERFORMANCE AND WEIGHTS OF S&P FAMILY INDICES AND S&P 500 COMPOSITE DURING THE CRISES  
  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Datastream
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Dot-com bubble
S&P 500
S&P500 Energy
S&P500 Industrials
S&P500 Health Care
S&P500 Financials 
S&P500 Utilities
S&P500 Materials
S&P500 Information 
Technology
S&P500 Telecom Services
19%
6%
10%
9%
13%
3%
3%
29%
8%
Jan 1999
22%
6%
11%
15%
21%
4%
3%
14%
4%
Jan 2002
Consumer
Energy
Industrials
Healthcare
Financials
Utilities
Materials
Technology
Telecom
21%
10%
10%
12%
22%
3%
3%
15%
4%
Jan 2006
20%
15%
11%
12%
13%
5%
4%
17%
3%
Aug 2007
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Financial Crisis
W
ith
dra
wn
 by
 th
e a
uth
or
14 
 
Frequency of returns is another issue that relates to estimation of beta. Though high frequency data 
provide better estimates of covariance, however it might just as well overlook the illiquidity of certain 
stocks. Should a stock be less liquid and not trade on particular days, the correlation with the market 
that is actively trading on those days will be low resulting a downward bias of beta estimate.10 
To go around illiquidity problem for stocks that trade infrequently even on monthly basis, one could 
employ a lagged-beta model (see further: Sum Beta) where stock excess returns are regressed on both 
excess market returns of the same as well as of the prior period. 
There has also been research carried out to check viability of betas measured on ultra high frequency 
basis, such as 5 min trading intervals. The authors base the research on the fact that bid/ask spreads and 
non-synchronous trading (also referred to as the market microstructure in the literature) produce 
autocorrelations which effectively deny efficient market hypothesis. They claim that if you measure 
returns on high-frequency basis (say on 1 minute intervals), these autocorrelations are reduced because 
asset prices do not make it on time to reach equilibriums11. However, we speculate that by measuring 
returns on such high frequency, one takes into account only the most active market participants, such as 
day traders and active proprietary traders; the returns induced by other (less responsive) types of 
market participants are excluded. We assume that it is the actual delay of other participants to 
incorporate market news into prices that most likely cause autocorrelations. The question then arises if 
beta estimated on minute-by-minute prices that are most likely moved only by active prop traders is a 
good estimate of systematic risk. We believe it is not. 
The market and the stock have to be extremely liquid to estimate covariance between the market proxy 
and underlying asset using, say, 1 day time frame of 5 min returns. Furthermore, beta estimated on such 
high frequency relies on timely and precise execution of trades which are subject to human error and 
errors in trading systems.  
  
                                                          
10
 Trading delays and price adjustment delays have been first discussed to bias beta estimates by Fisher (1966), and 
later grounded by Scholes and Williams (1977), Dimson (1979) and other authors in analytical and empirical 
research to provide evidence that betas are downward (upward) biased for stocks which trade less (more) 
frequently than the index used in the regression. 
11
 Tsay R.S., Yeh J.H., “Non-synchronous Trading and High-Frequency Beta” (2003); Andersen T.G., Bollerslev T., 
Diebold F.X., Wu J., “Realized Beta: Persistence and Predictability” (2004) 
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We believe that, next to liquidity, yet another problem with high-frequency betas is that it already 
enters the field of behavioral finance which is still a very young science. Until we can model human 
behavior and major services start providing high-frequency betas we believe it is not really a viable 
methodology. As a result, we believe that practical application of ultra high-frequency betas is yet 
decades away. High frequency betas might be useful in high frequency transactions and trading 
strategies, but not in corporate finance. 
To sum up, there are no established standards on the choices for inputs of calculating regression beta. 
However, we recommend adjusting the sample returns for non-recurring events and using the sample 
size which, most importantly, would exclude periods of market turbulence that distort a forward looking 
relationship between the stock and the market. Other choices, such as frequency, should be arbitrary 
based on market and stock liquidity. 
3.2.1 MARKET PORTFOLIO 
Though CAPM suggests that beta should be regressed based on market portfolio that includes all 
possible assets including human capital, it is rather impossible to construct such market portfolio. A 
common solution is to use a broad and well-diversified market index, such as S&P 500 or MSCI World 
Index. Analysts in the U.S. often rely on S&P 500 as a proxy for market portfolio, whereas finance 
professionals outside U.S. use MSCI World or regional MSCI indices. 
MSCI Barra Research claims that with diminishing barriers and market imperfections already in 80s a lot 
of investors started using All Country World Index as a proxy for market portfolio. AC World Index 
currently includes 23 developed markets that comprise The World Index as well as additional 22 
emerging markets. Furthermore, with the appetite for international small caps MSCI All Country World 
Investable Market Index that covers small caps was introduced. MSCI Barra Claims that AC World Index 
IMI covers 99% of global investment universe and is widely used now by investors as a proxy of market 
portfolio. 
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TABLE 3.1: CORRELATION BETWEEN MARKET PROXY INDICES 
  
THE 
WORLD 
INDEX 
Standard 
(Large+Mid 
Cap) 
THE WORLD 
INDEX IMI 
(Large+Mid+
Small Cap) 
AC WORLD 
INDEX 
Standard 
(Large+Mid 
Cap)  
AC WORLD 
INDEX IMI 
(Large+Mid+
Small Cap)  S&P 500 
THE WORLD INDEX Standard (Large+Mid Cap) 1         
THE WORLD INDEX IMI (Large+Mid+Small Cap) 0.999 1       
AC WORLD INDEX Standard (Large+Mid Cap)  0.997 0.996 1     
AC WORLD INDEX IMI (Large+Mid+Small Cap)  0.996 0.997 0.999 1   
S&P 500 0.876 0.882 0.850 0.855 1 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSCI Barra and Standard & Poor's data 
All correlations based on USD returns    
 
The performance of these indices is publicly available on the websites of data providers tracking them. 
As you can see from the correlation matrix above (Table 3.1) there is no radical difference in the choice 
for proxy of market portfolio. The correlation, especially in between global MSCI family indices is 
approximately 100%. Lower correlation of S&P 500 with MSCI World family indices might arise because 
of lower diversification of S&P 500 due to regional as well as large cap stock concentration comprising 
the index.  
TABLE 3.2: MARKET PROXY CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Number of 
assets 
Weight of top 10 
companies (%) 
Asset selection Risk 
(% Std Dev) 
Asset Selection Risk 
Contribution (% Total Risk) 
S&P 500 500 19.74 - - 
MSCI World 1,655 9.5 1.52 0.25 
MSCI ACWI 2,397 8.4 1.37 0.2 
MSCI ACWI IMI 8,531 7.4 1.21 0.15 
Source: MSCI Barra. Data as of June 2009 
    
The index volatility and performance results indicate that AC World Index IMI exhibits best risk/return 
characteristics measured over the past 4 years when the markets tumbled and were extremely volatile. 
This is likely due to high diversification common to a market portfolio. 
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TABLE 3.3: MARKET PROXY PERFORMANCE 
Index 
Monthly 
Volatility Return 
THE WORLD INDEX Standard (Large+Mid Cap) 27.13% -23.27% 
THE WORLD INDEX IMI (Large+Mid+Small Cap) 27.11% -22.03% 
AC WORLD INDEX Standard (Large+Mid Cap)  27.13% -20.43% 
AC WORLD INDEX IMI (Large+Mid+Small Cap)  27.02% -19.09% 
S&P 500 32.30% -22.21% 
Source: Author's calculations based on MSCI Barra and Standard & Poor's   
 
During periods of market volatility and asset bubbles MSCI World family indices will likely be a better 
proxy for market portfolio. As discussed previously, certain industries during extreme re-pricing distort 
the correlations in the market and drive the betas of companies in other industries to artificially low 
levels. Thus, we believe that using a broader index should help us reduce the effect of industry or 
country specific asset price discrepancies on beta estimates. 
It is also important not to estimate beta of a company based on a local index because it will not be a 
sensible measure for an international investor that has access to global markets. Beta will fail to 
represent systematic risk. Local index can be dominated by several large companies or industries and 
regressing on a local index will give a beta that measures company’s co variation with an industry or 
simply with itself. For instance, a mega cap company dominating a market would simply yield a beta of 
around 1 since it often moves the local market alone. 
Quite often no matter how precise and considerate you will be in deriving regression betas standard 
error will remain high while R^2 low. A conventional solution to increase precision of beta estimates is 
to use industry averages. Using a number of comparable companies and averaging their betas 
significantly reduces interval within which beta estimates are likely to fall12. Furthermore, using industry 
averages allows us to account for recent or even future changes in capital structure or business mix in 
                                                          
12
 As long as standard errors of beta estimates of different companies in the industry are uncorrelated, using bigger 
sample of betas to find average will reduce standard error since overestimates and underestimates of individual 
betas of companies in same industry tend to cancel out. Statistically, 
 
Standard Error industry = Average Standard Error comparable firm 
    √n 
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estimating a company’s beta13. As most of the readers are aware of, betas capture risks related to 
operating and financial leverage as well as cyclicality of a business. Building bottom-up betas will help us 
make better judgment on these underlying risks (see further for bottom-up approach). 
All in all, our choice of market proxy would be one of the Morgan Stanley Capital International family 
indices since these indices exhibit properties of market portfolio best. However, the choice for market 
proxy should always be consistent with the equity risk premium if the latter is obtained through 
services. 
3.2.2 ADJUSTING FOR FINANCIAL LEVERAGE 
Using a simple regression beta would disregard a forward-looking target capital structure if the company 
does not have optimal levels of leverage at the time when regression beta is calculated. Likewise, when 
calculating bottom-up beta, averaging betas of individual companies would ignore the leverage effect on 
individual businesses across industry. Most practitioners use the Hamada formula14 based on the 
famous theories of Miller and Modigliani on capital structure to account for leverage in the company: 
 
        (3.3) 
 
where: 
 - levered (equity) beta of the firm 
 - unlevered (asset) beta of a firm 
 - beta of debt 
 - beta of tax shields 
 – value of company’s tax shields 
 
Practitioners, however, simplify the formula at few instances. First, assuming that debt claim always has 
priority over equity holders’ claim on assets, beta of debt is very low, presumably zero. Second, if a 
company maintains a constant capital structure, value of tax shields will move in line with operating 
assets, therefore risk of the tax shields will be similar to that of operating cash flows, thus beta of the tax 
shields will be equal to unlevered/asset beta . Taking into account these simplifications, the 
Hamada formula can further be simplified (see Practitioner’s formula further). 
                                                          
13
 Damodaran A., “Investment Valuation: Tools and Techniques for Determining Value of Any Asset”, 2
nd
 Edition, 
John, Wiley and Sons (2002) 
14
 R. Hamada (1972), “The Effect f the Firm’s Capital Structure on the Systematic Risk of Common Stocks” 
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Different authors have suggested different formulae on relevering and unlevering betas (see appendix 
for summary). These formulas generally capture differently the risks of realizing tax savings resulting 
from the tax shields of debt in the capital structure. For instance, if a company has been losing money in 
the previous period, and it allocates its losses to the current accounting period to reduce the tax liability 
(which is a usual practice under GAAP), it will not realize tax savings from interest payments in the 
current period. As a result, the cost of debt will be greater by the loss/deferral of these tax savings 
(Grabowski, Pratt, 2008). 
Most of the formulas assume that there is no negative effect on operations from the amount of 
leverage, only interest cost. 
According to Grabowski and Pratt (2008), Hamada formula implies that total risk constitutes from mostly 
business rather than financial risk. To be more precise, it assumes that the debt is constant absolute 
value in the capital structure and therefore it understates the benefits of tax shields of highly rated debt 
of a public company: 
 
          (3.4) 
where: 
- levered/asset beta 
 – unlevered/equity beta 
D – market value of debt capital 
E – market value of equity capital 
t – tax rate 
 
Most companies, however, manage their leverage to target debt-to-equity ratio. 
Practitioners’ formula, on the other hand, assumes the least benefit from the tax shields. In other words, 
it assigns a considerable financial risk to the leverage: 
 
           (3.5) 
where: 
- levered/asset beta 
 – unlevered/equity beta 
D – market value of debt capital 
E – market value of equity capital 
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The choice of unvelevering and relevering formulas has significant impact on beta and, as a result, to the 
overall cost of equity. Basically, they treat the underlying risks of realizing tax shields differently due to 
tax-loss carryforwards mentioned earlier, and the more they assume that tax savings are unlikely, the 
higher the overall cost of equity and cost of capital will be. If for example some of the peer companies 
(discussed later) have high debt, Hamada formula will overestimate the unlevered beta. Also because it 
assumes constant debt whereas debt often changes during the five year estimation period of beta the 
formula would distort the true picture unless you account for capital structure changes during the 
period (say, by averaging capital structure over the 5 years). 
A lot of academics have concluded though that Milles-Ezzel formula reflects best the fact that firms 
maintain constant debt-to-equity ratio based on market values15. Fernandez formula is applicable best if 
firm maintains a fixed book value leverage ratio16. 
Milles-Ezzell formula is especially relevant in a distressed environment when debt betas are higher than 
before. Disregarding positive debt betas will likely lead to understating cost of capital: 
 
         (3.6) 
 
where: 
- levered/asset beta 
 – unlevered/equity beta 
 - beta of debt 
 - cost of debt prior to tax effect 
D – market value of debt capital 
E – market value of equity capital 
t – tax rate 
 
All in all, since companies typically manage their debt to target D/E ratios going forward, debt fluctuates 
in line with operating assets. As a result, tax shields also carry the risk of operating assets (or operating 
cashflows). The formula that captures that is the Harris-Pringle formula: 
 
                                                          
15
 Andre Farber, Roland Gillet, and Ariane Szafarz, “A General Formula for the WACC,” International Journal of 
Business (Spring, 2006): 211-218; Enrique R. Arzac and Lawrence R. Glosten, “A Reconsideration of Tax Shield 
Valuation,” European Financial Management (2005):458, Roger Grabowski, “Problems with Cost of Capital 
Estimation in the Current Environment” (2009). 
16
 Pablo Fernandez, “Levered and Unlevered Beta,” Working paper, April 20, 2006. 
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        (3.7) 
 
where: 
- levered/asset beta 
 – unlevered/equity beta 
 - beta of debt 
D – market value of debt capital 
E – market value of equity capital 
t – tax rate 
 
Theoretically, in a distressed environment Milles-Ezzell formula should work best because tax shields 
will be more closely linked to the value of debt which in turn fluctuates a lot during times of distress. It 
treats tax shields for one period as if they carried the risk of debt and in the following periods as if they 
carried the risk of operating assets. It essentially captures the fact that for one period a company will be 
in distress, but it will be profitable afterwards and it will be able to use the tax shields again. However, 
Grabowski (2008) shows in his calculations that betas relevered with Harris-Pringle and Milles-Ezzell 
formulas yield results that are virtually the same. Having said that, our recommendation is to use the 
Harris-Pringle formula as it both accounts for varying beta of debt capital and has a form that is rather 
familiar.  
3.2.3 ADJUSTING FOR OPERATING LEVERAGE 
After having accounted for different capital structure, one can adjust asset beta for different operating 
leverage (proportion of fixed cost in the total cost structure) as an intermediate step between 
unlevering and relevering company’s equity beta. Companies that operate under high fixed cost run 
higher risks especially when there are changes in revenues. As a result, one can observe that cyclical 
businesses have lower fixed cost than those with stable stream of revenues or those in the mature 
industries.  
Removing the effect of fixed cost from the cost structure works rather the same way as removing 
financial leverage from capital structure.  
To account for differences in operating leverage, Damodaran (2002) suggests adjusting the unlevered 
equity beta from average operating leverage in the industry to the company’s level of operating 
leverage:  
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   (3.8) 
where: 
 – unlevered beta of equity 
 – unlevered beta of equity after accounting for operating leverage 
 – unlevered beta of equity, industry standard 
FC – fixed Cost 
VC – variable Cost 
 
This would remove the implicit (erroneous) assumption that all companies in the industry have same 
operating leverage. Once you have concluded on the cost structure of the business in question, you can 
relever the business beta to the current or target operating leverage to arrive at a better estimate of 
asset beta. 
3.2.4 ADJUSTING FOR CASH 
Companies often hold significant amounts of cash or cash equivalents for operating or other purposes. 
Cash holdings often vary across the industries and require additional adjustments because of their 
different underlying risks than those of the business itself. If cash and financial investments comprise a 
small portion of total assets, this adjustment can be incorporated in the calculations of beta. 
Unless analyst decides upon valuation of liquid securities separately from cashflows derived from 
operations (by reducing net income by the revenue arising from financial investments), it is necessary to 
increase/decrease the unlevered beta accordingly if cash investments carry higher/lower risk than 
operating assets. To do so one can calculate the weighted average of unlevered betas of business (i.e. 
non-cash operating assets) and cash equivalents. 
  
     (3.9) 
 
If cash in the company is invested in extremely safe and liquid investments such as t-bills or commercial 
paper, these holdings do not carry systematic risk and their beta is zero in turn.  
   (3.10) 
         (3.11) 
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In case one computes bottom-up beta (see further), an analyst can reduce debt value by the amount of 
cash holdings and relever the betas to the resulting net debt to equity ratio17. This will have a similar 
effect as the formula (3.11). Lower D/E ratio will result in lower betas and lower cost of equity. However, 
when calculating cost of capital more weight will fall on cost of equity which will at least partly offset 
lower COEC. 
To sum up, typically cash in contrast to other assets in the company carries no or little systematic risk. As 
a result, it is necessary to adjust unlevered beta by increasing it relative to the size of cash holding to 
avoid understating the true beta of operating assets. 
3.2.5 MODIFYING BETA 
If the betas used were somewhat static and not forward looking the application of the CAPM would be 
rather restricted. There have been research carried out that betas tend to converge to market and 
industry averages. The two proposed ideas were to adjust beta to the industry norm, a technique called 
Vasicek’s shrinkage18, and to the market norm, what is known as the Blume’s adjustment19.  
Vasicek suggested that betas with high standard error tend to converge to industry norm more than 
those with low standard error. As high betas are likely to be those with high standard error, they by rule 
tend to industry averages more. The technique finds weighted average between peer group beta and 
company beta, giving more weight to peer group beta if the standard error is high. 
A better known adjustment is the Blume’s adjustment which is also used by Bloomberg and Value Line. 
It involves multiplying beta by one third and adding two thirds to obtain a beta that is more forward 
looking. This is based on the assumption that betas tend to average market beta of 1 over time.  
          (3.12) 
where: 
 – adjusted beta 
 – raw beta 
 
                                                          
17
 Aswath Damodaran, “Dealing with Cash, Cross Holdings and Other Non-Operating ssets: Approaches and 
Implications”, (September 2005) 
18
 Oldrich A. Vasicek, A note on Using Cross-Sectional Information in Bayesian Estimation of Security Prices,” 
Journal of Finance  (1973) 
19
 Marshall Blume, "Portfolio Theory: A  Step Towards Its Practical Application,"  Journal of Business (April 1970). 
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With the idea behind similar to that of Vasizek’s industry shrinkage, a more advanced market smoothing 
technique has been proposed by Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2004). Whenever the standard error of 
beta is high, the following technique used by McKinsey & Company will tend beta to market average:  
 
         (3.13) 
 
where: 
 – adjusted beta 
 -  raw beta 
 – cross-sectional deviation of all betas 
 – standard error of the regression beta 
 
Other adjustment, called the Sum Beta20, tries to capture delay with which a stock price reflects market 
information. It is especially persistent in midsize and smaller companies. The adjustment tries to reduce 
this lag effect by adding two independent regression coefficients: first, stock’s excess returns on 
market’s excess returns, and second, company’s excess returns on previous period’s market excess 
returns. All excess returns are calculated over 30 day T-bill rate given the one month sample frequency 
of the regression accordingly. This supposedly captures the lag of comovement between the stock and 
the market and enables beta to reflect systematic risk better. When price reactions to the stock market 
are non-synchronous, the correlation between the stock returns and the market returns is lower, and as 
a result, traditional OLS betas are biased downwards for companies other than the largest ones21. 
Though this understatement of systematic risk is often captured as excess return of smaller companies 
over CAPM predicted returns in a small firm premium, the precision of it is as debatable as the small 
firm premium itself. The 2006 SBBI Valuation Edition22 shows that excess returns over CAPM (i.e. 
deviation of actual data from the model) calculated with sum beta are significantly lower than excess 
returns over CAPM calculated with simple OLS beta. This might explain partly the failure of CAPM to 
correctly estimate returns for smaller companies, and perhaps, suggest improved accuracy of Sum Betas 
over OLS Betas. Some analysts prefer to calculate Sum Betas and make smaller adjustment for the size 
effect in the CAPM. Finally, sum betas are specifically useful in the current distressed environment as 
                                                          
20
 Roger G. Ibbotson, Paul D. Kaplan, and James D. Peterson, “Estimates of Small-Stock Betas Are Much Too Low,” 
Journal or Portfolio Management  (Summer 1997): 104-111. 
21
 Scholes and Williams (1977), “Estimating Betas for Nonsynchronous Data” 
22
 SBBI Valuation Edition 2006 Yearbook (Chicago: Morningstar, 2006), Table 7-10, 143. 
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market capitalization of a lot companies has shrunk pushing them to midcap to smallcap size and making 
them less responsive to market changes. 
All things considered, Blume’s adjustment has gained more ground over the years than other smoothing 
techniques. This is likely due to a wide application of the adjustment by the major services. Finally, sum 
betas offer a promising way to account for market anomalies and delays in trading of certain stocks 
when calculating betas. Therefore, one should consider using the method when calculating a solo 
regression beta. 
3.2.6 BOTTOM-UP BETA 
When the stock data is noisy, the prices are experiencing large corrections during times of distress or 
simply are unavailable as it happens for the privately held companies, the traditional top-down 
approach of estimating beta of a company from regressing excess returns is often no good (i.e. low R^2, 
high standard error). Instead, one can use bottom-up approach by deriving beta based on the peer 
group and fundamentals. Damodaran (2002) suggests breaking the beta risks into underlying 
components, notably financial and operating leverage based on peer companies in the same industry or 
business segment. He claims further that because betas of different assets can be averaged by using 
their market weights, company’s beta is essentially a weighted average of betas of businesses that it 
operates in. As a result, to find bottom-up beta based on the peer group, we can use regression betas of 
listed companies that operate in the same industries as the subject company. The levered betas should 
then be averaged within every group of companies (see Figure 3.4).  Then using average industry D/E 
ratios, unlevered betas should be found for every business/industry group that the subject company is 
in. Though it might seem reasonable to unlever every peer company separately and then average the 
betas, Damodaran argues that this will likely compound standard errors of peer betas.  
Finally, these unlevered betas should be weighed against the proportion of value or - if the latter is 
unavailable - income/revenue that is derived from every business/industry that the subject company 
operates in. Summing up these weighted betas would give unlevered beta of the subject. The unlevered 
beta can be afterwards relevered to the target D/E ratio. 
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FIGURE 3.4: CALCULATION OF BOTTOM-UP BETA 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
Using comparable firms to derive company beta allows us to avoid one major flaw of regression betas – 
large standard error in estimation. By using a larger number of peer companies it is possible to reduce 
this interval within which the true beta falls. If the standard errors of betas are uncorrelated across the 
peer group, averaging their betas would reduce standard error exponentially if compared to the 
standalone regression beta of the subject company23. In the Figure 3.5, you can see how two illustrative 
standard errors of beta shrink as the number of comparable companies used increases.  
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FIGURE 3.5: STANDARD ERROR OF BOTTOM-UP BETA 
 
Quite obviously, the biggest disadvantage of including numerous comparable companies in the 
calculation of beta of the subject company is the computational cost. Not only is it time consuming to 
run regressions for betas of a number of peer companies; often it is hard to define the comparable 
companies.  
To avoid running regressions manually for every peer group company, one can use service betas such as 
Bloomberg. The returns should be regressed against a well diversified global equity index. On the other 
hand, if the returns are regressed against a local index the sample peer group should be large enough so 
that estimation errors would average out.  
The number of comparable companies in the peer group should be around 20, as a rule of thumb. While 
the larger number would reduce the standard error as shown previously, the benefits would be very 
marginal (a sample of 20 comparable companies reduces SE by around 80 percent, whereas a sample of 
100, by 90 percent). As a matter of fact, one should define the comparable companies according to the 
number of players in the industry. If there is a large number of companies, one could narrow it by 
industry segment, revenue size etc. However, if there are only few players, you might want to consider a 
broader picture.  
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Firstly, industry raw betas should be averaged using simple average instead of a weighted one. Simple 
average would not undermine smaller companies in the calculation and, as a result, would help 
minimize standard error of estimation. The same applies for using median in this case. Though a general 
practice of central tendency in finance is often median, to reduce standard error for bottom-up betas 
one should use mean instead of median.  
Secondly, even though the underlying cost structure in comparable companies is similar, if big 
differences in operating leverage exist, one should remove it using the formula noted earlier.  
All in all, using comparable firms to derive beta enables us to account for changes in business mix, major 
divestures, acquisitions or restructurings. All these changes can be factored in by adjusting peer groups 
accordingly. Say, if a company is divesting a unit, we exclude the respective industry for estimating beta; 
or on the contrary, if a company has plans to enter a new market, we include the comparable companies 
that operate in it for estimating beta. Finally, using comparable companies to estimate beta allows us to 
overcome such issue as lack of quality data often common for newly listed or private companies. 
3.2.7 DEBT BETA 
During times of distress debt often carries systematic risk that tends to be ignored in conventional 
calculations of cost of equity. The risk of debt capital is measured by the beta of debt which is calculated 
in an analogical way to equity beta (regressing market returns on debt returns). The debt betas account 
for the risk that interest is paid when due as economy or market proxy changes. As a result, ignoring 
significantly positive debt betas would provide us with incorrect estimations of equity betas and cost of 
capital thereof.Debt betas are positively correlated with credit ratings and, as research suggests24, in the 
long-run have been in the range between 0.30 and 0.40. 
Generally, there are two proposed approaches in estimating debt betas. 
The first one is to use a general regression formula to come up with debt betas:25 
 
        (3.14) 
 
where: 
                                                          
24
 Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels,Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies, 4
th
 
ed. (John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 32.  
25
 Simon Benninga, Financial Modeling, 2
nd
 ed. (Cambridge, 2000), 414. 
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 – return on subject debt 
 – debt beta 
 – historical market return 
 – risk-free rate 
t – marginal tax rate 
 
The second approach is to calculate the implied debt beta using market risk premium and default spread 
(actual or synthetic) over the risk-free rate. The calculation then relies on the assumption of how much 
risk captured by the default spread is attributable to the market risk.  
 
       (3.15) 
 
Schaefer and Strebulaev (2006) that attempted to predict debt betas concluded that a rather small 
proportion of overall yield spread reflects credit risk26. Damodaran (2002) in his calculations assumes 
half of default spread attributable to the market risk. 
Debt betas have been increasing as financial distress has continued over the past several years. As 
equity values have been wiped out, debt to equity ratio, hence relative financial leverage has been 
increasing. Figure 3.6 depicts this relationship between the levels of leverage and betas of equity and 
debt. 
FIGURE 3.6: LEVERAGE AND ITS IMPACT ON BETAS 
Source: Korteweg A., The Cost of Financial Distress (September, 2007), working paper 
                                                          
26
 Schaefer S., Strebulaev I., “Risk in Capital Structure Arbitrage” 
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Duff&Phelps also provide with evidence of increasing debt betas over the period of recent financial crisis 
(see table 3.4). Having said that, it is crucial to account for positive debt betas in a distressed 
environment. 
TABLE 3.4: RECENT DEBT BETAS BY CREDIT RATING 
Rating Dec 2008 May 2009 August 2009 
Aaa 0.12 0.20 0.22 
Aa 0.17 0.21 0.24 
A 0.35 0.33 0.36 
Baa 0.42 0.38 0.41 
Ba 0.68 0.55 0.58 
B 0.77 0.66 0.69 
Caa 1.11 1.00 1.03 
Ca-D 1.50 1.49 1.49 
Source: calculations by Duff&Phelps LLC; the regression method 
 
To simplify the calculation of debt beta, we check the validity of Damodaran’s implied beta formula. We 
use Duff&Phelps regression debt betas, and assumption that 50% of risk captured by the default spread 
is attributable to the market risk. This way we deduce the MRP implied in the formula: 
TABLE 3.5: MARKET RISK PREMIUM IMPLIED BY DEBT BETAS 
Rating Date Bd Spread MRP 
%Market 
Risk 
Aaa 
Dec-08 0.12 4.70% 19.58% 50% 
May-09 0.2 5.36% 13.40% 50% 
Aug-09 0.22 5.12% 11.64% 50% 
Baa 
Dec-08 0.42 8.07% 9.61% 50% 
May-09 0.38 7.76% 10.21% 50% 
Aug-09 0.41 6.38% 7.78% 50% 
 
 Table 3.5 above shows that attributing 50% of spread to the market risk significantly overstates the 
market risk premium which historically did not exceed 6%. If the relationship between the variables 
holds correctly, we can estimate ourselves the percentage of market risk captured by the spreads by 
inputting market risk premia: 
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TABLE 3.6: PERCENTAGE OF MARKET RISK ATRIBUTABLE TO THE CREDIT SPREADS USING IMPLIED MRP 
Rating Date Bd Spread 
Implied 
MRP* 
 
 
%Market 
Risk 
Aaa 
Dec-08 0.12 4.70% 6.43% 
 
16% 
May-09 0.2 5.36% 5.94% 
 
22% 
Aug-09 0.22 5.12% 5.30% 
 
23% 
Baa 
Dec-08 0.42 8.07% 6.43% 
 
33% 
May-09 0.38 7.76% 5.94% 
 
29% 
Aug-09 0.41 6.38% 5.30% 
 
34% 
*from Damodaran.com 
As you can see from Table 3.6 above, the percentage of market risk we should attribute to spreads 
highly depends on the bond grade. High grade bonds (Aaa) are less susceptible to systematic risk 
(around 20% yield spread compensating for the market risk) whereas investment grade bonds (Baa) 
compensate more for the systematic risk relative to the spread (around 30%). Similarly, below in Figure 
3.7 we plot the choice of historical MRP and the resulting implied median perc. of yield spreads 
attributable to the market risk of both high grade and investment grade bonds using debt betas on the 
three related dates. Effectively, one could use these conditional percentages to find the debt beta for 
the two bond grades at any given time using the formula as a rule of thumb. 
FIGURE 3.7: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARKET RISK PREMIUM AND THE PERCENTAGE OF MARKET 
RISK ATRIBUTABLE TO THE CREDIT SPREADS 
 
Note that this way of deducing implied betas falls short on the fact that the market risk premium that 
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spread. Nonetheless, if we use mid-range market risk premium which is very likely to be the one that the 
bond traders assume, it should yield approximately correct debt beta. 
All in all, we believe though that the regression betas should be superior as they measure directly the 
covariance of bond yields with the market returns. Thus, if one requires these estimates without 
significant computational effort, she could use bond index data provided by the services and major 
investment banks and the related debt beta estimates. 
4 EQUITY RISK PREMIUMS 
4.1 MARKET RISK PREMIUM 
Equity risk premiums are by far some of the most important elements in estimating cost of equity and 
the overall cost of capital. Studies have found that estimations of equity risk premiums lead to the 
highest errors in estimation of cost of capital27. Another study suggested that different estimations of 
ERP on average impact cost of equity at around 2 percentage points and can be as high as 4 percentage 
points28. 
As with regards to market risk premium, a lot of debate turns around not only about specific details of 
methodology used, but also about fundamental approach on how to find market risk premium. Though 
the most common practice so far has been estimating MRP from historical premium data, not always 
can it be extrapolated as historical data is not necessarily representative of the future expectations. 
Three different approaches that most academics and practitioners present to estimate equity risk 
premium are to survey the expectations and sentiments of analysts, managers or academics; obtain ERP 
from historical premium of past equity returns relative to the riskless investment and, finally, estimate a 
forward-looking premium based on the market rates or prices on traded assets today. 
One of the most extensive surveys carried out to date available publicly is by Fernandez29. He has 
examined opinions of analysts, company managers, academics and corporate finance textbook authors. 
                                                          
27
 Wayne Ferson and Dennis Locke, “Estimating the Cost of Capital through Time: An Analysis of the Sources of 
Error,” Management Science (April 1998): 485-500. 
28
 Seth Armitage, The Cost of Capital: Intermediate Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 319-
320. 
29
 See Pablo Fernandez, “Market Risk Premium used in 2010 by Analysts and Companies: a survey with 2,400 
answers”, (May 2010) 
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While analysts and managers present opinions that are closer to realized equity premiums, it is 
interesting to find that academics are very inconsistent in their opinions with premiums on average 
higher by around 2% than those of practitioners. Fernandez also finds that in over 150 valuation 
textbooks MRP has declined from 8.9% in 1988 to 5.7% in 2009.  
While survey premiums have been tracked for over a decade now and have become more accessible, 
they are rarely applied in practice for computations since premiums obtained from investor sentiment 
are overly responsive to recent stock price movements. Furthermore, there are more psychological 
elements that were found to play a role in the results, including the way a question is framed. Finally, 
suffice it to say, as in every investor survey there is a risk that responders might have incentives to 
introduce a bias in their opinions.    
The most widely used approach of estimating market risk premium remains historical premium 
approach, where long-term returns on stocks are compared with long term default-free (government) 
securities. The difference provides us with a realized historical risk premium. 
Though there is consensus that historical data is the most representative of actual premium, many 
different sources30 indicate that it is yet not a solid figure and can range anywhere from zero or even 
negative figures to 12% depending on the methodology used to calculate it. The reasons behind the 
differences mainly lie in the choice of risk-free rate as well as market proxy, averaging method and 
historical time span. 
The two different schools often disagree about the length of period for estimation of MRP. On one side, 
there is a big support for shorter recent periods that are thought to represent a more updated view on 
the future. On the other side, there is a prevalent opinion that longer time spans should gauge the 
reality better as history tends to repeat itself. Nonetheless, each of the approaches has its pitfalls. Using 
shorter period for estimation leads to higher standard error (ex. Given 20% standard deviation of stock 
returns, standard error would go up three times shrinking a sample from 80 to 10 years). On the other 
hand, using longer periods of time might forego the fact that trading was infrequent in the past and 
fundamental characteristics of economy and the market have changed. In essence, one might find a 
discussion on how much data to extrapolate analogical to the debate between the fundamental and 
technical analysis, which, in fact, never ends. An analyst is then left to find the golden mean (or choose a 
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better between the two evils). Either way, should the analyst pursue to calculate equity risk premium 
instead of using service data, non-recurring events should be removed from the sample in order to 
improve its predictive power. In fact, an interesting observation made by Damodaran is that including 
the period with the recent financial turmoil in calculation or ERP would downgrade long-term ERP by 
1%. This eventually would lead to a flawed conclusion that one of the worst crises in history (and the 
flight-to-quality that followed) has made equities a safer investment.  
TABLE 4.1: EQUITY RISK PREMIUMS UNDER DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS 
 
ERP: Stocks minus T.Bills ERP: Stocks minus T.Bonds 
 
Arithmetic Geometric Arithmetic Geometric 
1928-2009 7.53%  6.03%  5.56% 4.29%  
1967-2009 5.48%  3.78%  4.09% 2.74%  
1997-2009 -1.59%  -5.47%  -3.68% -7.22%  
Source: Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation and Implications, Damodaran (2010) 
 
Despite the large variation in estimates, Damodaran31 suggests that using long-term geometric average 
premium over the long-term rate as the risk premium should yield the most unbiased result (here, 
4.29%).To be more precise, one should consider that using t-bill over t-bonds would undermine the 
term-structure of interest rates and the fact that it is long-term government bonds that are often used 
as risk-free rate in corporate finance and valuation (see earlier discussion). Therefore, one should stick 
to t-bonds for the ERP estimates. As pointed out previously, he also suggests that taking into account 
longer period for estimations would reduce significantly the noise and standard error relative to the 
actual equity premium size. Finally, using geometric mean over arithmetic mean would prevent from 
overstating premiums because returns tend to mean revert32. 
Grabowski (2008) suggests that the optimal approach to estimating the equity risk premium is taking 
arithmetic average of 50 years of excess returns. He claims that 50 year sample excludes events that are 
unlikely to repeat (World War 2, the Great Depression etc.) and extreme stock market volatility that 
dominated 30s through 50s. Furthermore, taking a sample larger than 50 years does not account for 
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 Aswath Damodaran, Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation and Implications (February 2010) 
32
 Recent research by Fama and French (1988a, 1988b), Poterba and Summers (1988), and Bekaert and Hodrick 
(1992) finds significant autocorrelation between stock returns in different periods over the long run. They 
speculate that this is because of a stationary component in stock prices which implies that stock returns should 
mean revert over time. 
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limited opportunities for international diversification. Studies have shown 33  that international 
diversification lowers volatility which results in lower market risk premium. Finally, taking a shorter 
period than that, increases standard error of estimation as well as might bias results due to the fact that 
there was a persistent downward movement of interest rates since 1981. From 1950s to 1981, however, 
interest rates have been hiking so taking a 50 year sample captures the full cycle of interest rates34.  
Either way, market risk premium derived using 80 year sample and geometric average as suggested by 
Damodaran is rather similar to ERP found using 50 year sample and arithmetic average as suggested by 
Grabowski, both slightly above 4%. Note that geometric average of the same data sample nearly always 
gives lower ERP than arithmetic average. One study35 concluded though that market risk premium 
should lie somewhere in between arithmetic and geometric average, being closer to geometric average 
as data sample increases and autocorrelations of market returns become more negative. 
Finally, a word of caution is that historical risk premiums should be applied only to mature markets as 
volatility and only a small sample of reliable data featured in emerging markets would lead to standard 
errors that would otherwise make ERP inapplicable.  
As discussed earlier, financial turmoil can rather distort the estimates of ERP. In line with the 
calculations of Damodaran, Credit Suisse has shown a staggering fact that shorter, i.e. recent ten-year 
equity premiums have become negative on a global scare, while 50-year premiums are just around 1%: 
  
                                                          
33
 Gikas Hourdouvelis, Dimitrious Malliartopulos, and Richard Priestley, “The Impact of Globalization on the Equity 
Cost of Capital”, Working paper, May 2004 
34
 Booth, “Estimating Equity Risk Premium and Equity Costs” 
35
 Daniel C. Indro and Wayne Y.Lee, “Biases in Arithmetic and Geometric Averages as Estimates of Long-run 
Expected Returns and Risk Premia,” Financial Management (Winter 1997), 81-90. 
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TABLE 4.2: EQUITY RISK PREMIUMS IN COUNTRIES UNDER DIFFERENT TIME SAMPLE PERIODS 
Country  2000-2009  1960-2009 1900-2009  
Australia  1.00%  3.50% 6.00%  
Belgium  -5.70%  1.00% 2.60%  
Canada  -2.00%  1.50% 3.70%  
Denmark  -0.10%  0.90% 1.80%  
Finland  -10.2%  4.10% 4.60%  
France  -6.50%  -0.90% 3.30%  
Germany  -6.90%  0.40% 5.40%  
Ireland  -8.20%  3.50% 2.60%  
Italy  -7.20%  -1.50% 3.80%  
Japan  -7.80%  -0.80% 5.10%  
Netherlands  -8.60%  3.30% 3.50%  
New Zealand  -0.90%  2.80% 2.40%  
Norway  1.90%  2.00% 2.00%  
South Africa 3.30%  6.60% 5.40%  
Spain  0.50%  3.70% 2.40%  
Sweden  -3.90%  4.40% 3.60%  
Switzerland  -3.40%  2.80% 2.10%  
UK  -3.10%  3.30% 3.90%  
US  -7.40%  2.30% 4.20%  
World  -6.60%  0.90% 3.70%  
World ex US -5.20 %  0.60% 3.80%  
Europe  -5.70%  1.30% 3.90%  
Source: Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook, 2010, data by Morningstar Inc 
 
The finding again reminds the fact that recent events might not provide us with data representative of 
the future. Furthermore, one can notice that premiums on a global scale are often much lower than 
regional equity premiums. Damodaran speculates that averaging regional equity premiums (arithmetic 
mean) reduces survivor bias that is present in calculating local equity premiums. Lower global ERP might 
be no surprise, however, bearing in mind that a choice for market proxy (ex. S&P500 vs MSCI World) 
should have a similar impact on calculating ERP due to the levels of diversification underlying local and 
global indices.  
What drives risk aversion of the investors and the resulting ERP? Lettau, Ludwigson and Wachter 
(2008)36 argue that the primary source is the volatility in the economy. In particular, lower real economic 
growth and unstable macro fundamentals lead to lower appetite for equities and a higher ERP thereof. 
Damodaran (2010) further adds that quality and reliability of information available to investors plays a 
vital role. The absence of quality information observed in emerging markets is one of the key reasons for 
higher equity risk premiums in such markets. 
                                                          
36
 Lettau, M., S.C. Ludvigson and J.A. Wachter, 2008. The Declining Equity Risk Premium: What role does  
macroeconomic risk play? Review of Financial Studies, v21, 1653-1687. 
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Clearly the macro fundamentals have a significant impact on the risk-aversion of the investors. However, 
as you can see from the graph, ERP is not entirely dependent on economic conditions.  
FIGURE 4.1: TIME SERIES OF THE HISTORICAL EQUITY RISK PREMIUM IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on NBER and Morningstar data; time-series rolling 10 year arithmetic 
averages 
 
Despite the comprehensiveness of historical data, estimates of historical premium are backward looking, 
however. Estimated MRP, on the other hand, should be conditional to the market situation as of the 
date of valuation.  A well grounded solution offered by Damadoran to overcome the problem and obtain 
a more updated and forward-looking premium is to calculate an implied equity risk premium. One of the 
most elaborate yet intuitive ways to do that is to build a DCF model based on current market prices of 
market proxy and expected cash flows from its constituents. 
To put it straight forward, Damadoran (2010) uses dividends along with share buybacks to calculate free 
cash flow to equity (FCFE) which are later discounted with required return on equity to arrive at present 
value of equity index. The argument for including share repurchases is that over the last decade 
companies have paid only half of their FCFE as dividends whereas they have used the remaining cash 
balances that they built up over time to fund their stock buybacks. Therefore, taking the aggregate of 
dividends and stock buybacks should allow us to estimate total cash flows to equity more precisely. The 
model advantage comes from the fact that it can be split into several growth phases accounting for 
changes in the growth of earnings and dividends in the short and long term. 
Having said that, the value of equity is derived as follows: 
-5,0%
0,0%
5,0%
10,0%
15,0%
20,0%
US Historical Equity Risk Premia
NBER Recessions
ERP
W
ith
raw
 by
 h
e a
uth
or
38 
 
       (4.1) 
Where: 
 – expected free cash flows to equity at time t 
 – cost of equity or required return on market portfolio by investors 
 – expected growth rate after year N 
 
The equation shows that equity will generate expected free cash flows (potential dividend) that will 
grow with the earnings until year N and will exhibit stable growth rate g_N after year N. Given the 
current value of the equity and potential dividend (and stock buyback) yield, we can solve for the rate of 
return on equity k_e required by investors. Subtracting risk-free rate from the required return on equity, 
we will arrive at what Damodaran claims to be “a more realistic” estimate of equity risk premium. 
The two methods suggested have their own pros and cons. If one believes in efficient markets, current 
implied equity risk premium estimated from current level of index is the best choice. Contrary, if you 
believe that markets can be undervalued or overvalued, you should use average historical or average 
implied equity premium. Finally, depending on the purpose of analysis, an analyst might choose to use 
one or another. Implied equity risk premium should give a better snapshot of company value at the time 
in acquisition (using different historical ERP figures would implicitly assume that the market is 
undervalued or overvalued). On the other hand, historical averages come in handy when deriving cost of 
capital for calculations of long-term company investments. 
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FIGURE 4.2: RECENT IMPLIED EQUITY RISK PREMIUMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 Source: Damodaran.com  
The implied premiums, however, should be treated with care; lack of market wide consensus estimates 
for growth that would truly be incorporated in the market prices as of the day of valuation, absence of 
historical consensus growth estimates (say, dating back to 60s) that would allow us to check the validity 
of model by comparing the implied results with the realized premiums - all of these loose ends make the 
approach questionable. Those who argue for implied premium, claim that nowadays information moves 
faster, investors are more sophisticated and markets are deeper. However, in such case risk associated 
with holding equity investments should be lower than in the previous decades. As a result, implied 
equity risk premium should be lower than the realized historical premia too. However, if you track 
implied equity risk premia by Damodaran, you will find that it is mostly higher (even than the historical  
premium estimated by Damodaran). 
Nonetheless, it is the most forward looking model developed so far that is also widely preferred by the 
investment banks. And even though it rests on human capacity to predict future, in our opinion, it is still 
the best cross-check when choosing a number out of the range of historical realized equity risk 
premiums.  
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Having said that, with all the research carried out, we believe that the conditional equity risk premium 
should fall in the range between 4% and 5%, being on the higher end during economic down cycle 
(hence, risk-averse investors demanding higher premium for risky investment) and on the lower end 
during economic up cycle when the markets are bullish. 
4.2 FAILURE OF CAPM: ADDITIONAL PREMIUMS 
4.2.1 SMALL FIRM PREMIUM 
Studies since early 1980s have found that small firms earn returns in excess of those estimated by 
CAPM37. Many studies have pursued the suit in search of small firm premium to come up with diverse 
results. Some argued that small firm premium is truly a temporary phenomenon as it has disappeared at 
some points in time. Others claim that it can be not the market cap but other factors playing the role, 
for instance, illiquidity of such stocks or lack of quality information available on them. Small firm 
premium has been approached as a market anomaly by some. However, those that oppose this theory 
argue that market participants would have exploited it for the profit and it would not persist while, in 
fact, studies show that small firms still earn excess returns at present day.  
A more conventional way to approach small firm premium is to assume failure of CAPM betas to fully 
gauge the systematic risk present in smaller companies. We would then look for returns that small firms 
would produce in excess of CAPM estimates. 
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 Branz (1981), Reingunum (1981), Dimson (1986), Bergstorm, Frashure and Chislom (1991), Chan, Hamao and  
Lakonishok (1991) 
W
ith
dra
wn
 by
 th
e 
uth
or
41 
 
FIGURE 4.3: TIME SERIES OF SMALL FIRM PREMIUM IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on 2008 Ibbotson SBBI Valuation Yearbook 
 
In the Figure 4.3 we present time series of US small firm premium. The figure represents a 50-year 
moving average of micro-cap38 stock excess returns over CAPM. We believe that the present day small 
firm premium should be estimated dating back 50 years as this would be more reflective of current 
market situation as well as allow us to exclude non-recurrent events that preceded the data sample 
(WWII, the Great Depression etc.). As you can see from the figure, beginning of the series captures the 
first half of 1900s which is why we believe the small firm premium is more pronounced. The estimates 
are quite consistent with a widespread presumption that small firm premium lies in the range between 
2 to 6 percent. Other calculations by Damodaran, Morningstar and Duff&Phelps indicate that the small 
firm premium lies on the upper end of the scale, i.e. starting at around 5% at the lowest decile39. The 
difference, we assume, comes from the fact that it is based on the lowest decile of ranked portfolios 
instead of the lowest pentile portrayed in the time series. Again, small firm premium depends on how 
we define a small firm and how small we think the company is going to be in the future. 
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 Lowest market cap size pentile (bottom 20%) in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
39
 See SBBI Valuation Yearbook and Duff&Phelps Risk Premium Report for detailed data and calculations 
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FIGURE 4.4: EXCESS RETURNS OVER CAPM RANKED BY DIFFERENT PORTFOLIO SIZES 
Source: data from Duff & Phelps Risk Premium Report 2010 (see appendix 2) 
There are several key drawbacks to be noted before applying small firm premium. Firstly, small firm 
premium estimates often come with large standard errors that make the application rather dubious. 
Secondly, small caps happen to become large caps over time (Microsoft employed 11 people in 1978). 
Our suggestion is to be very considerate when applying small firm premium together with aggressive 
growth assumption (in excess of inflation) in calculations of terminate value of a company. Thirdly, 
recent developments in beta calculation techniques such as the sum beta have shown to partly correct 
for the failure of CAPM to capture extra risks of small firms. Moreover, size premium is exposed to same 
calculation biases discussed earlier as the market risk premium (historical sample size, averaging method 
etc.) although these computational choices should be made according to estimation methodology of 
ERP. Finally, just as mentioned earlier, one should make sure that the small firm premium is not 
overlapping with other company specific risk factors such as illiquidity. 
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4.2.2 ILLIQUIDITY PREMIUM 
It is already a widely accepted axiom that illiquid assets with same characteristics are less valuable than 
liquid ones. The question though is what defines the illiquidity and how to measure or account for in 
valuing assets. 
A lot of studies have been carried out under assumption that all the assets are illiquid to certain degree 
and that this illiquidity can be measured in bid-ask spreads of the traded assets and turnover ratios as 
key factors. 
Many studies since 1970 have attempted to incorporate illiquidity into asset pricing models with rather 
mixed results. A study by Amihud and Mendelson (1989)40 has shown that every 1% increase in bid-ask 
spread led to a quarter percent higher annual return. Furthermore, Datar, Nair and Radcliffe (1998)41 
show that every 1% increase in turnover ratio reduces excess annual returns of illiquid stocks by around 
half percent. Numerous other studies have also found consistently higher returns on less liquid stocks 
using turnover ratios and bid-ask spreads as proxies for illiquidity42. Even though nearly all of the studies 
accounted for factors such as firm size or market-to-book value, the application of illiquidity discount in 
practice still remains a misty subject. 
One recent study43 has found that illiquid stocks return on average 1.1% higher annual return and that 
80% of this premium can be explained by the illiquidity of the stock market itself. Having that in mind, 
we believe that individual stock illiquidity might be more a matter of general market risk premium 
estimates during bearish times in that case. 
The most recent research44  on the topic carried out by Roger Ibbotson and Zhiwu Chen (2009) also 
presents an  evidence that illiquid basket of stocks outperforms a liquid one. They claim that illiquidity, 
in fact, explains excess returns better than size. However, the results are very questionable considering 
the absence of calculation methodology. 
                                                          
40
 Amihud, Y.  and  . Mendelson,  1989,  the Effects  of Beta, Bid-Ask  Spread, Residual Risk  and  Size  on  
Stock Returns, Journal of Finance, v 44, 479-486. 
41
 Datar,  V.T.,  N.  Y.  Naik  and  R.  Radcliffe,  1998,  “Liquidity  and  stock  returns:  An  alternative  test,”  
Journal of Financial Markets 1, 203-219. 
42
 see Brennan and Subrahmanyan (1996), Eleswarapu  (1997), Nguyen, Mishra  and  Prakash  (2005) 
43
 Acharya,  V.  and  L.H.  Pedersen,  2005,  Asset  Pricing  with  Liquidity  Risk,  Journal  of  Financial  
Economics, v77, 375-410. 
44
 http://advisor.morningstar.com/articles/article.asp?docId=16609  
http://www.morningstar.com/cover/videocenter.aspx?id=348365  
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Rephael, Kadan and Wohl (2008) find that liquidity premium on trading volume-basis has declined over 
the past four decades45. They measure it in all firm sizes and find that the results are statistically 
unrelated to size effect.  They argue that with the rise of ETFs and index funds illiquidity premium has 
been virtually erased on volume-basis and very low on other liquidity measures because anyone now 
can have exposure to illiquid stocks through these vehicles without experiencing any trading delay. 
Grabowski (2008) argues that all the excess returns that are featured in less liquid stocks can be 
captured by the small firm premium. He argues that bid-ask spreads are often quoted on exchanges but 
are not realized for most of illiquid stocks while bid-ask spread is further mitigated by the fact that it is 
measured on higher frequency basis, whereas excess returns for SFP, on monthly basis. He further adds 
that transaction cost which a lot of academics claim to be higher for illiquid securities is also partly 
captured in SFP. Either way, it has been acknowledged that small firm premium overlaps with illiquidity 
premium as, naturally, those are the small stocks that trade thinly. The issue however is that most 
academics focus on explaining excess returns either based on size or liquidity without trying to establish 
a firm relationship between the excess returns based on the two measures. 
There has been a huge debate going on whether small firm premium or illiquidity premium (discount) 
has more explanatory power in measuring excess returns. In the world of finance, however, illiquidity 
premium has not been accepted as much as small firm premium. Perhaps the reason behind is that it is 
rather hard to define what truly makes an asset illiquid and to control for other factors (ex. size of a 
traded blocks of stock has an impact on bid/ask quote for any company size). Furthermore, we believe 
that application of illiquidity premium would also complicate estimation of cost of equity for private 
companies as they are not traded and could not be cross-referenced to their traded peers on the basis 
of bid/ask spread or turnover ratio. Using size premium, on the other hand, is not hard to look up for 
returns in excess of CAPM for comparable size traded companies. Also note that private companies are 
valued using specific illiquidity discounts for lack of marketability46 and applying illiquidity discounts 
twice at several levels rather stands against a common sense.  
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 Azi Be-Rephael, Ohad Kadan, and Avi Wohl, “The Diminishing Liquidity Premium” (June 2008) 
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 Discount for lack of marketability is already a common practice in valuing private companies.  The discount is 
applied at enterprise value level of a company and as studies show is around 30% (see Pratt, Shannon P. and Alina 
V. Niculita, “Chapter 17: Discounts for Illiquidity and Lack of Marketability,” Valuing a Business: The Analyis and 
Appraisal of Closely Held Companies, 5
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Liquidity certainly matters for many other classes of assets as well, such as fixed income securities or 
collectibles. However, when it comes to stocks, our recommendation is to stick to small firm premium 
when checking for excess returns over CAPM of smaller and less liquid companies. 
4.2.3 COUNTRY RISK PREMIUM 
The country risk premium arises from the fact that over the last several decades economies around the 
globe have become very closely linked. Correlations between international stock markets have been 
increasing and possibility for international diversification – diminishing. During times of distress these 
correlations can become excessively high as seen in the recent contagion of stock market crashes 
worldwide. 
Given the fact that all investors should be rewarded for any non-diversifiable or systematic risk, CAPM 
betas theoretically should also explain why global investors investing in two stocks with same underlying 
business/financial risks in two different countries demand different returns. However, CAPM and its 
variants (ex. Global CAPM) fails to do so despite the fact that the risk of investing in what investors 
perceive as a more risky country qualifies as systematic risk: it is non-diversifiable (or extremely limited 
due to high correlations between international stock markets) while barriers for cross-border 
investments (significantly higher transaction cost etc.) have been virtually erased with developments of 
technology. In fact, Damodaran shows that betas in riskier emerging market not only fail to gauge these 
extra risks, but are lower if regressed against a proxy of global market portfolio such as MSCI World 
Index instead of local index.  
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FIGURE 4.5: STOCK MARKET CORRELATIONS ACROSS REGIONS AND TIME 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on MSCI Barra regional index data. Correlations based on ten-year 
average monthly returns in local currencies. 
 
Damodaran suggests that some analysts also calculate country risk premium by measuring relative 
(higher) volatility of emerging market over mature market (say, Brazil over US). They then multiply 
equity premium (US) by the relative volatility factor to obtain a higher equity risk premium: 
        (4.2) 
where  – country risk premium,  – market risk premium in the developed market (e.g.US), 
 – stock market volatility in the emerging market,  – stock market volatility in the developed 
market.  
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This might work for a country like Brazil that has relatively high trading volumes. However, in a country 
like Bulgaria volatility of local market might be lower than in a mature market like US simply due to 
lower trading volumes which eventually will result in a negative country risk premium. 
Damodaran further suggests that one could combine relative local equity market volatility with default 
spread. You first obtain relative emerging stock market volatility with respect to the volatility of 
country’s sovereign debt (EM stock market volatility/EM sovereign bond volatility). You then multiply it 
with country default spread. This presumably captures both equity market volatility and default risk 
associated with the country. However, given the fact that this relative volatility factor measures stock 
market volatility in local terms, one should question if this method does not defeat the purpose of 
calculating country risk in the first place. After all, we are trying to bring in a perspective of a global 
investor when adding extra country risk premiums in the CAPM. 
In the end, the most straightforward and widely accepted method for estimating country risk premium 
is (i) using standalone default spread of country’s sovereign debt; or (ii) regressing a country’s sovereign 
debt returns against risk-less debt returns. Both methods essentially should yield similar results. Perhaps 
the latter would be more responsive to recent changes in the economy and stock market behaviour as 
ratings often lag the markets but it would then have to be adjusted for non-recurrent events as these 
would distort a forward looking view. 
There is couple of problems related to extracting country risk premium from default spreads. First, 
country’s sovereign debt might not be denominated in the same currency as the riskless debt making it 
hard to compare with risk-free rate. Second, country’s sovereign debt might not be rated. 
To overcome the first problem, one could cross-reference two identical ratings of emerging market 
sovereign bonds and use the one that has sovereign debt denominated in major currencies. 
If country’s sovereign debt is not rated, hence the second problem, one could look up for a comparable 
country that has a similar country risk score in the Economist or other similar services that ranks 
countries based on fundamental economic and political risks. We could then attach a bond rating of this 
comparable country and derive a sovereign default spread thereof. The problem with such rankings 
though is that they are not linear (rank 20 does not implicate that a country is twice as risky as that 
which is ranked 10th).  
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In practice, country risk premiums mostly are added on top of equity risk premium of a mature market 
such as US. As a result, beta that is larger than 1 essentially amplifies country risk, while beta that is 
lower than 1 diminishes it. This way we assume that the subject company is exposed to country risk as 
much as to the market risk47: 
A.1)         (4.3) 
where  - stock beta,   – market risk premium in the developed market (e.g.US),   – country 
risk premium, and  – risk free rate in the developed market. 
Because inputs used for calculation of cost of equity are quoted in USD terms, one has to account for 
inflation rate differentials between US and the emerging market: 
A.2)          (4.4) 
where  - stock beta,  – cost of equity in the emerging market in local currency,  – cost of equity 
in the emerging market in USD terms,  - inflation rate in the emerging market and  - inflation 
rate in the US (or equivalent). 
Another method offered by practitioners is to use local risk free rate over developed market risk 
premium in calculations of cost of equity in emerging market: 
B.1)          (4.5) 
where  - stock beta,  – cost of equity in the emerging market in local currency,  – market risk 
premium in the developed market (e.g.US),  - risk free rate over the developed market risk 
premium. 
To account for the effect of local currency, one can use currency swap spread which in turn is 
considered to incorporate both country risk as well as currency risk. 
B.2)        (4.6) 
 - risk free rate over the developed market risk premium,  – risk free rate in the developed 
market,  – currency swap spread. 
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 If we assume that every company in the country is exposed to country risk equally, the country risk is 
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There are couple of points to question regarding the currently used methodology in practice. First, are 
country risk premiums really sufficient to compensate for lower betas regressed against a global index? 
Damodaran estimates that an average beta in an emerging market is lower when regressed against a 
global index than regressed against a local index. For instance, he estimates that an average beta in 
Brazil is 0.98 on local basis and 0.81 on global basis. Assume 10 year US t-bond rate is 3.65% and 
Brazilian 5.25%. Equity risk premium in the US is 4.3%. Given the latter, the cost of equity for an average 
company in Brazil estimated on a global basis would be: 
 = 0.81 (4.3% + 1.6%) + 3.65%=8.43% 
 
However, assuming that businesses in Brazil are less risky on a global scale than on a local scale stands 
against common sense48. If we have used beta regressed on local market cost of equity for an average 
Brazilian company would be:  
 = 0.98 (4.3% + 1.6%) + 3.65%=9.43% 
 
Let alone x% out of country risk premium would then make up for the failure of betas to capture all 
systematic business risks measured on a global scale: 
0.81 (4.3%+1.6%+x)+3.65% = 9.43% 
x=1.23% 
 
It is rather striking to find that if betas were lower, country risk premium should be higher by more than 
1% over the estimated 1.6%. 
The second aspect that raises questions and should wary anyone intending to apply the country risk 
premium relates to credit default swap spreads for sovereign debt as a proxy for country risk. 
Damodaran shows that CDS spreads are only marginally different from sovereign debt default spreads 
on average and virtually the same at some points over time. Having that in mind, he suggests that CDS 
spreads could be a measure of country risk premium. At the time of the study, 14 Feb 2010, CDS market 
yielded 1.58% for Brazilian sovereign long term debt, while default spread on the same Brazilian debt 
was 1.6%. However, CDS spread on US t-bonds was 49bp. If we assume that US t-bonds are riskless, 
                                                          
48
 Since betas measure both directional change and magnitude, β= ρ (σ /σm), we assume that the lower betas of 
emerging markets regressed on a global index result from: (i) lower volatility of EM stocks due to lower trading 
volumes or (ii) lower correlation of EM stocks with global index due to developed market stocks comprising the 
index. 
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country risk premium on Brazil should then be naturally lower than approximately 1.6%. In fact, just a 
month later US government 10-year swap spread turned negative, implying that for the first time in 
history the cost of borrowing for corporations (as measured by the 10 year swap rate) was lower than 
the cost of borrowing for US government. Not surprisingly, high quality companies had seen their debt 
offering lower yields than US treasuries. 
Some analysts prefer using corresponding US corporate bond spreads as proxies for country risk given 
much higher participation and liquidity in US corporate debt market as compared to foreign sovereign 
debt. Bearing in mind the discussion earlier, we believe that corporate debt spreads might be a better 
proxy for country risk premium as well. 
PriceWaterouseCoopers have a slightly different approach to country risk premium. They have 
developed a uniform model that establishes a synthetic rating based on multiple rating agencies. They 
take the following steps to come up with a country risk premium. 
 (i)  Obtain direct bond market default spreads for a sample of countries where bonds are comparable, 
i.e. denominated in foreign developed market currency (e.g. USD), have similar duration and liquidity;  
(ii)  Obtain sovereign credit scores from rating agencies such as Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, 
Euromoney and EIU;   
(iii)  Convert algebraic ratings into numerical percentages representing risk levels. The 20 bands of 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings are converted into numerical percentages using a linear 
relationship. Euromoney and EIU provide the risk assessment already in numerical percentage form. 
(iv)  Regress numerical percentages against sovereign default spreads of the sample countries where 
there is direct sovereign bond information. 
 (v)  Obtain statistical relationship between numerical percentages and default spreads to derive a 
predictive model of country risk. PwC finds a strong exponential relationship with R squared over 90% 
between the numerical risk level percentages and sovereign default spreads. They build this exponential 
relationship for all 4 rating agencies, obtain a risk premium based on sovereign debt default spread for 
each and then average all available country risk premiums to arrive at a single measure of country risk 
premium for an emerging country. They then apply the country risk premium for both cost of equity and 
cost of debt on top of the risk free rate: 
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          (4.7) 
where  – risk free rate in the emerging market,  – risk free rate in developed market (e.g. US) 
and CRP – country risk premium (in this case sovereign debt spread). 
Kruschwitz, Loﬄery and Mandl (2010) argue that using CDS and sovereign debt spreads as suggested by 
Damodaran and used by others is an intrinsically wrong method and that country risk premium generally 
can only be applied in multi-factor asset pricing models49. Revoltella, Mucci and Mihaljek (2010) point 
out that CDS spreads tend to overshoot 10-20 times during times of distress making them a loose proxy 
for country risk premium50. They suggest that in order to price country risk using CDS spreads it is 
necessary to remove the market sentiment. 
Finally, one should not forget that emerging markets that have country risk premiums attached mature 
over time. This would technically demand for adjustment going forward. However, bearing in mind that 
country risk premium has been applied only for a limited period of time, there is no in-depth research 
carried out up to date regarding the adjustment. 
All in all, country risk premium estimates have been largely based on bond spreads and credit default 
spreads with only minor suggested improvements. Although Damodaran also proposes calculating 
country risk premium using implied equity premia, due to the biases that implied equity risk premiums 
remain exposed to, especially in the emerging markets, we do not recommend this approach. Until then, 
we suggests to use CDS and bond spreads as proxies for county risk premium. 
 
  
                                                          
49
 Kruschwitz L. , Loﬄery A., Mandl G. (2010), “Damodaran’s Country Risk Premium: A Serious Critique”, on Social 
Sciences Research Network 
50
 D. Revoltella, F. Mucci and D. Mihaljek (2010), “Properly pricing country risk: a model for pricing long-term 
fundamental risk applied to central and eastern European countries”, Financial Theory and Practice vol. 34 (3) p. 
219-245  
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4.2.4 COMPANY-SPECIFIC RISK PREMIUM 
There have been attempts to account for extra-risks in the CAPM that relate to company-specific risk 
factors. Grabowski (2008) argues for company-specific risk adjustments based on the fact that typically 
investors do not hold diversified portfolios as assumed by CAPM and seek for advice on portfolio 
diversification. This would be a good argument if diversification proved either extremely costly or 
unobtainable as in the case of country risk premium. However, large institutional investors have been 
long diversified, while index funds have made diversification more feasible than ever before even for the 
smaller investors. Thus, we believe that adding company-specific risk premium looks more like a desire 
to tweak CAPM just to match required returns of undiversified investors than to correct for a failure in 
the general CAPM framework. As Brealey, Meyers and Allen explain, company specific risk factors 
should be instead incorporated in the cashflow forecast. In our opinion, this would not only fit the 
general CAPM framework better, but also assure that company specific risks are not double-counted. 
For instance, valuing firms in distress, an analyst should calculate expected values of future cashflows 
that incorporate upside and downside scenarios, such as bankruptcy, rather than attaching additional 
idiosyncratic risk premiums and then extrapolating historical cashflows. On the other hand, the 
systematic risk arising in distressed environment would then be captured by equity51 as well as positive 
debt betas in the calculations of cost of capital.  
With regards to capital structure, firms in distress often deviate from its target capital structure for 
several periods. We believe that adjusting expected value of cashflows should also offset the cost of 
capital levered for target D/E ratio that is consistent only with a healthy business environment. 
Note that whatever the adjustments are, it is important to treat risk factors based on the underlying 
assumptions of the asset pricing models. 
All in all, we recommend avoid using any additional company-specific risk premiums as these risk should 
be captured in the variation of the expected cashflows.  
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 As pointed out before, during times of market downturn and distress correlations between the troubled stocks 
and the market tend to 1. If we used shorter look-back period and higher data frequency to estimate equity betas 
of distressed companies, they should be higher, hence, reflect any systematic risk of distress. Otherwise, one could 
use bottom-up industry betas and relever them to higher D/E ratios arising from depressed equity values of a 
distressed company. 
The former, however, is valid for distressed firms only. Healthy stable firms such as those in consumer industries 
often see correlations diverge when market plummets. Therefore, one should avoid using same sample period of 
estimating beta for stable companies as they might then be artificially low. 
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5 COST OF DEBT 
Calculating cost of debt is a rather straightforward process as compared to cost of equity. Basically 
speaking, it is expected yield to maturity on its debt. However, the problem is that expected values are 
not available and only the promised rate of return based on promised coupon payments of company’s 
bonds can be implied. The promised YTM is found by solving for internal rate of return of company’s 
long term bond payments (e.g. using goal seek or solver). 
The bonds of choice for calculating cost of debt should be long-term because of the same underlying 
reasons as the long-term risk-free rate used in the cost of equity calculations. It should also be liquid 
enough so that prices (and therefore YTM) would be responsive to market conditions. Furthermore, it 
should not have options attached since they affect price without having any impact on coupon 
payments which in turn distort yield to maturity and our proxy for cost of debt. Finally, coupon rate can 
be used as proxy for cost of debt only at the time the bond is issued and only if it is issued at par value. 
If the bonds traded do not meet the criteria above, one can either infer the cost of debt by using credit 
spreads provided by the rating agencies or calculate synthetic spreads. 
If the bond is rated by a rating agency such as S&P and Moody’s, cost of debt is easily obtained by 
adding the related bond spread to a risk-free rate (US Treasuries).  
For companies with high-yield debt only YTM would be a bad proxy for cost of debt. Because high yield 
debt has disproportionally larger yields than those of investment grade bonds due to different 
underlying probabilities of default as well as recovery rates, cost of debt would be excessively high using 
YTM. A solution then is to use a simple CAMP and high-yield debt betas to estimate cost of debt for such 
companies. 
Debt betas can be obtained using the methods outlined previously in the related section. 
If the company is not rated, Damodaran suggests checking the recent bank borrowing history or 
estimating a synthetic rating using interest coverage ratios. Once an interest coverage ratio is 
established, one can reference it to the relevant credit rating to estimate an implicit spread: 
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TABLE 5.1: INTEREST COVERAGE RATIOS AND CREDIT RATINGS 
Interest Coverate Ratio:  
Small Market Cap (<$5 billion) 
Interest Coverate Ratio:  
Large Market Cap (>$5 billion) 
Rating Typical Default 
Rate 
<12.5 >8.5 AAA 1.25% 
9.50-12.50 6.5-8.5 AA 1.75% 
7.50-9.50 5.5-6.5 A+ 2.25% 
6.00-7.50 4.25-5.5 A 2.50% 
4.50-6.00 3-4.25 A- 3.00% 
4.00-4.50 2.5-3.0 BBB 3.50% 
3.50-4.00 2.00-2.25 BB+ 4.25% 
3.00-3.50 2.00-2.25 BB 5.00% 
2.50-3.00 1.75-2.0 B+ 6.00% 
2.00-2.50 1.5-1.75 B 7.25% 
1.50-2.00 1.25-1.5 B- 8.50% 
1.25-1.50 0.8-1.25 CCC 10.00% 
0.80-1.25 0.65-0.8 CC 12.00% 
0.50-0.80 0.2-0.65 C 15.00% 
<0.65 <0.2 D 20.00% 
Source: Compustat and Bondsonline.com. Calculations by Damodaran (2009). 
 
This is, however, a very rough approximation since rating agencies use multiple ratios and even 
qualitative information such as interviewing top management regarding the future plans of a company 
to set up a rating. Table 5.2 below by Moody’s presents multiple dimensions over which synthetic rating 
could be established. 
TABLE 5.2: FINANCIAL RATIOS AND CREDIT RATINGS 
Universe of companies AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC 
EBITA/Average Assets 15.3% 15.6% 12.5% 10.1% 9.6% 7.3% 2.0% 
Operating Margin 14.9% 17.0% 13.8% 12.6% 12.2% 8.5% 1.6% 
EBITA margin 14.8% 17.5% 15.2% 13.9% 13.4% 9.4% 2.4% 
EBITA / Interest 17.00x 13.70x 8.20x 5.10x 3.40x 1.50x 0.30x 
[FFO + interest expense] / Interest expense 15.5x 15.5x 9.6x 6.6x 4.7x 2.6x 1.5x 
Total Debt/EBITDA 0.90x 1.00x 1.70x 2.40x 3.30x 5.00x 6.30x 
Total Debt / [Total Debt + Equity + Minorities] 22.7% 32.5% 39.1% 44.8% 53.5% 70.2% 92.5% 
FFO / Debt 117.3% 68.4% 43.8% 29.2% 21.8% 12.0% 4.3% 
[FFO - Dividends Paid] / Net Debt 96.3% 38.4% 38.7% 27.7% 20.0% 11.7% 4.6% 
CAPEX / Depreciation 1.60x 1.40x 1.30x 1.20x 1.20x 1.10x 0.90x 
Number of companies 6 35 176 354 436 442 56 
Source: Moody december 2007, global universe including NA, EMEA and AsiaPacific 
For emerging market companies Damodaran suggests restating ratios in dollar terms to account for 
extra risks that these companies might exhibit. Moreover, it has already become a general practice to 
add a country risk premium on top of company default spread while calculating cost of debt of an 
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emerging market company. Nevertheless, Damodaran argues that this might be correct only if the 
company is riskier than the country it operates in and only if the revenues are generated in the 
emerging market. 
5.1 TAXES 
Since interest is tax deductable and reduces company’s earnings in the income statement before the 
corporate tax is applied, thus providing an interest tax-shield, analysts use cost of debt on after-tax basis 
by multiplying it with (1 – Tax Rate) in the enterprise valuation.  
For valuation purposes, most analysts use marginal tax rate which sometimes differs from the effective 
tax rate obtained by dividing taxes due by the taxable income. Marginal tax rate, on the other hand, 
measures the rate at which an extra dollar would be taxed, hence the marginal.  
FIGURE 5.1: CORPORATE TAX RATES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
For example, in the US marginal tax rate can vary depending on the current taxable income and the 
incremental income that a company is expected to receive in the near future. Because there are 
statutory tax bubbles in the tax brackets, companies might see marginal income taxed at higher rates 
than the effective tax rate on the total taxable future income. However, as taxable income grows 
beyond the highest bracket of $18,333,333, marginal tax rate converges to effective tax rate which is flat 
at 35%. Generally, marginal tax rate can be defined as: 
         (5.1) 
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Some practitioners define marginal taxes as those that the company would pay if the financing or non-
operating items were removed52. Foreign operations or debt might, however, complicate the calculation 
of marginal tax rate. 
Notwithstanding, the main problem is in the legal environment that most academics and practitioners 
identify while trying to determine the marginal tax rate. Graham in his research53 provides with a 
simulation where he shows that most of the companies will not realize tax shields at statutory rates 
because of tax-loss carryforwards and backwards. This means that companies after recovering after 
losses would have to operate profitably for several years until they can enjoy tax deductions again. 
Eventually, this would lead to lower marginal tax rate, which according to simulation, is lower than 
statutory rate by 5% for an average US company. As a result, if a historical effective tax rate is lower 
than marginal tax rate, it might be reasonable to assume a lower rate. On the other hand, for healthy 
strong companies marginal tax rate would be as high as statutory rate in the last tax bracket, i.e. 35% for 
US.  
To sum up, calculating cost of debt is not as complex task as calculating cost of equity. However, there 
are several caveats, notably a reasonable forward looking marginal tax rate as well as synthetic rating 
that demand extra diligence when calculating the after-tax cost of debt.  
6 WEIGHTED AVERAGE OF COST OF CAPITAL 
Weighted average cost of capital is mainly used to value the whole enterprise or the equity thereof. The 
most appropriate framework portraying WACC valuation is the following: 
 
Value of a Levered Firm = Value of Levered Assets = Value of Debt – Value of Tax Shields + Value of 
Equity 
 
In such case an after-tax cost of capital is applied to net after-tax cashflows of a firm assuming tax 
deductibility of interest expense: 
                                                          
52
 See Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels,Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies, 
4
th
 ed. (John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 177.  
53
 John Graham, “Debt and Marginal Tax Rate”, “Proxies for the Corporate Marginal Tax Rate” (1996), “Using Tax 
Return Data to Simulate Corporate Marginal Tax Rates” (2007) 
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       (6.1) 
where: 
 – weighted average of cost of capital 
 – cost of equity capital 
 - cost of debt capital 
 - cost of hybrid securities 
 - weight of equity capital in the capital structure 
- weight of debt capital in the capital structure 
 - weight of hybrid securities in the capital structure 
 
In traditional WACC framework a company should use capital structure that minimizes its cost of capital 
therefore maximizing present value of future cashflows it generates and the company value thereof. 
WACC as a function of total leverage can be depicted with the classical WACC “smile” that plots the 
relationship between leverage, overall cost of capital and its elements: 
FIGURE 6.1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WACC, COST OF EQUITY AND COST OF DEBT 
Cost of         Cost of Equity 
Capital 
        WACC 
 
           Cost of Debt 
 
 
          
 
Optimal   ___Debt___ 
Leverage  Total Capital 
 
The shape of the WACC smile is also consistent with the recent research54 which concludes that excess 
leverage has a more negative impact for a company than insufficient leverage (you can observe WACC 
curve increasing faster from the point of optimal leverage when extra debt is levied, not when it 
marginally decreases). 
Amounts of debt that companies carry are often related to profitability and cyclicality of business.  
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 Jules Van Binsbergen, John Graham, and Jie Yang, “ The Cost of Debt”, Working paper (Sep 2007) 
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When a company is more profitable, it can afford more leverage without running a risk of falling behind 
its interest payments. On the other hand, when a company is less profitable and there is a risk that it will 
not be able to meet its debt obligations, adding extra leverage will increase the risk of default, and debt 
and equity holders will demand extra compensation for such risk. 
Businesses that are mature and less susceptible to economic shifts, i.e. low beta firms, such as those in 
consumer goods, often carry significant amounts of debt. High-tech companies often are financed 
mainly by equity as they carry higher risks of falling short in cash since they use every marginal dollar for 
new product developments.  
Though levels of leverage vary quite extensively among industries, researchers found that they might 
vary even more within an industry55.  
To estimate WACC one should either use current market values of debt and equity outstanding or target 
(industry) levels assuming that a company operates under suboptimal capital structure temporarily. Our 
suggestion is to apply target weights as in volatile markets outstanding values of equity and debt might 
not be reflective of future long-term periods. If there are significant changes in the capital structure, one 
should use varying WACC adjusted for both different weights of cost of debt and equity. Under such 
circumstances though, most practitioners suggest using APV valuation method. 
When choosing industry D/E ratios, we advise to estimate median values instead of using averages. As 
Savage (2009) recalls, one should always remember a statistician who drowned crossing a river that is 
on average 3 feet deep56. In other words, one should not make a judgement about a central value in the 
sample without knowing the distribution. Even if you do know the distribution and you notice that 
several points in the sample are extreme values, mean is very likely to understate/overstate a true 
forward-looking central value of the sample. Generally, Savage argues that decisions based on build-up 
methods with underlying inputs as averages are on average wrong. There has also been research carried 
out that shows simple mean values to consistently overstate valuation multiples57. All in all, it is a 
generally accepted truth in statistical-financial sampling to use medians. However, as an exception to 
                                                          
55
 Peter MacKay and Gordon Phillips, “How Does Industry Affect Firm Financial Structure?”, The Review of Financial 
Studies, Issue 4 (2005) 
56
 Savage S., “The Flaw of Averages: Why We Underestimate Risk in the Face of Uncertainty”, Wiley (2009)  
57
 See Ruback R.S. and Baker M., “Estimating Industry Multiples” (1999). The authors find that the best measure of 
central tendency for multiples is harmonic mean that lies in between arithmetic and geometric means. Harmonic 
mean does not suffer from misweighting the data in the sample. However, further empirical research on 
application of harmonic mean in corporate finance has not been carried out so far. 
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that, we suggest to use mean value if the data sample is really small without significant outliers. Median 
basically eliminates information from data points around it and if the sample is small we believe we 
cannot afford that.  
Returning to D/E ratios, should one decide to use current market values (say, for acquisition purposes), 
it is important to include the value of debt equivalent claims such as operating lease.  
The value of operating lease liabilities can be estimated using the following formula (6.2) below. Note 
that debt equivalent claims should be incorporated in total debt only if one plans to adjust free cash 
flows for these claims later on as well. 
         (6.2) 
 
If debt and equity values cannot be extracted from market information, e.g. as it happens for private 
companies, one can look up for book value of debt, although it is recommended to avoid using book 
values for distressed companies as market value of such liabilities might be significantly lower. Equity 
values can be either deduced using multiples or running an iterative DCF. Iterative DCF is performed 
assuming reasonable capital structure; it is then repeated using the resulting debt to enterprise values 
until valuation does not yield significantly different results. 
In summary, up till now we have outlined the process of calculating cost of capital. Employing the 
methods described in the Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 one should be able to arrive at the estimate of cost 
of equity backed up by extensive considerations. Chapter 5 has provided a brief yet detailed overview 
on both how to estimate the cost of debt for rated and non-rated companies as well as why an analyst 
should treat marginal tax rate with care for after-tax cost of debt calculations. Finally, in the current 
chapter we put the main elements of weighted average cost of capital together, introduce several 
important considerations on capital structure and close the overview of cost of capital. 
In the following section, we look at how sensitive to the underlying assumptions is one of the building 
blocks of cost of capital, namely cost of equity.   W
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7 COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL SENSITIVITY TO BETA ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
 
Cost of equity is undoubtedly the most widely debated element of overall cost of capital among 
academics and practitioners. Equity premiums have been researched since the dawn of CAPM, and yet, 
there is no single consensus on how to best estimate these premiums. Betas, however, have been 
surrounded less by this ambiguity. This is partly because of a wide acceptance of few major services that 
have been proposing their methodologies and providing their estimates of systematic risk measures for 
at least several decades now. Nonetheless, many users of CAPM often forget how crucial the choices 
made are in calculating betas.  
The following research provides a good insight on how different methods in calculating beta from the 
returns of a single stock can impact the cost of equity capital. To illustrate the varying betas and COEC, 
we analyze returns of Kraft Foods Inc. on a number of dimensions often proposed in COEC estimations. 
7.1 METHODOLOGY 
To check the results that different beta estimation methodologies yield, we run 16 different regressions 
based on a combination of choice of index, data sample period and frequency, possible adjustment for 
non-recurring events in the sample and, finally, calculation technique of beta itself. The two beta 
regression techniques used are Ordinary Least Squares and Sum-Beta. Sum-beta is estimated adding two 
independent regression coefficients: first, company’s excess returns over market’s excess returns, and 
second, company’s excess returns over previous period’s market excess returns. Excess returns are 
calculated over 30-day Treasury bill yields corresponding to the dates of observations. 
The 16 resulting betas are unlevered using three different methodologies to result in a total of 48 
different betas, which are then rounded to 2 decimals. The methodologies used are Hamada, Harris-
Pringle as well as additional methodology often applied by practitioners. We unlever the raw betas using 
debt-to-equity ratios provided by Thompson Reuters. Despite rather significantly varying D/E estimates 
for Kraft Foods Inc. by the author and other services, Thompson Reuters is chosen to remain consistent 
given the fact that it also provides corresponding industry and sector D/E ratios, which are later used to 
relever betas. We use this company debt to equity ratio as well as the latest book values to total debt 
(inclusive of all interest bearing debt and lease obligations) to estimate the value of debt and equity all 
together. Using the latest book value of cash and short-term investments, we adjust the unlevered beta 
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for cash and estimate the beta of operating assets. The betas are then relevered using sector D/E ratios 
assuming that a median company in the sector operates under efficient capital structure. Finally, the 
relevered betas are smoothed using the Blume’s adjustment. 
The frequencies and sample periods used are 5 year sample using monthly observations and 2 year 
sample using weekly observations. We select these settings under assumption that it is the most widely 
accepted choice by both services and by practitioners.  
To adjust for non-recurring events we inspect for extreme trading volumes and low correlations. We 
have determined a period of recently lower correlations between the stock and the market during 
FY2009 Q3 through FY2010 Q2. We exclude this period based on the assumption that merger 
negotiations between Kraft and Cadbury that took place recently distort a forward looking relationship 
between the Kraft’s stock and the market. To make up for excluded observations, we extend the look 
back period to match the size of data sample across regressions. 
The marginal tax rate used to unlever/relever betas using Hamada formula is 35%. This is above the 
effective tax rate of 29.37% for FY2009. However, we use the highest future marginal statutory tax rate 
expecting a significant increase in Kraft’s taxable income going forward. After paying down the debt, we 
believe that an already global dominant position of Kraft in food production and retailing strengthened 
by the merger with Cadbury will further add to growth in Kraft’s EBT. Kraft ranks #53 on Fortune 500 list. 
The debt beta used to unlever/relever betas using Harris-Pringle formula is 0.2. This an average estimate 
of debt betas calculated between 1963-2009 by Duff & Phelps on companies listed in NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ. We believe the estimate is a representative of medium-investment grade credit rating that 
Kraft Foods have. 
The overall 48 resulting betas are then referenced, ranked by size and included in a table measuring 
Kraft’s COEC sensitivity to the choice of market risk premium and beta. 
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TABLE 7.1: METHOD OF CHOICE AND THE RESULTING BETAS FOR KRAFT FOODS INC. 
Index 
choice 
Sample 
period/ 
frequency 
Data Regression 
Results:Raw 
Beta 
Unlevering 
formula 
Results: 
Unlevered 
Beta 
Adjusted 
for Cash 
Relevered 
to sector 
Smoothed 
(Blume's 
adjustment) 
Reference 
number 
S&P 
500 
5 years/ 
monthly 
Recent 
Sample 
Sum-Beta 0.74 
Hamada 0.46            0.49  0.62 0.74 (1.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.48            0.51  0.63 0.75 (2.) 
Practitioners 0.39            0.41  0.58 0.72 (3.) 
OLS 0.59 
Hamada 0.37            0.39  0.50 0.66 (4.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.41            0.43  0.52 0.68 (5.) 
Practitioners 0.31            0.33  0.46 0.64 (6.) 
Ex.non-
recurring 
events 
Sum-Beta 0.89 
Hamada 0.56            0.59  0.75 0.83 (7.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.56            0.59  0.75 0.84 (8.) 
Practitioners 0.47            0.49  0.70 0.80 (9.) 
OLS 0.67 
Hamada 0.42            0.44  0.56 0.71 (10.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.44            0.47  0.58 0.72 (11.) 
Practitioners 0.35            0.37  0.52 0.68 (12.) 
2 years/ 
weekly 
Recent 
Sample 
Sum-Beta 0.59 
Hamada 0.37            0.39  0.50 0.66 (13.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.41            0.43  0.52 0.68 (14.) 
Practitioners 0.31            0.33  0.46 0.64 (15.) 
OLS 0.56 
Hamada 0.35            0.37  0.47 0.64 (16.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.39            0.41  0.49 0.66 (17.) 
Practitioners 0.29            0.31  0.43 0.62 (18.) 
Ex.non-
recurring 
events 
Sum-Beta 0.59 
Hamada 0.37            0.39  0.50 0.66 (19.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.40            0.43  0.52 0.68 (20.) 
Practitioners 0.31            0.33  0.46 0.64 (21.) 
OLS 0.61 
Hamada 0.39            0.41  0.52 0.68 (22.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.42            0.44  0.54 0.69 (23.) 
Practitioners 0.32            0.34  0.48 0.65 (24.) 
MSCI 
World 
5 years/ 
monthly 
Recent 
Sample 
Sum-Beta 0.65 
Hamada 0.41            0.43  0.55 0.70 (25.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.44            0.46  0.57 0.71 (26.) 
Practitioners 0.34            0.36  0.51 0.67 (27.) 
OLS 0.54 
Hamada 0.34            0.36  0.45 0.63 (28.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.38            0.40  0.48 0.65 (29.) 
Practitioners 0.28            0.30  0.42 0.61 (30.) 
Ex.non-
recurring 
events 
Sum-Beta 0.77 
Hamada 0.49            0.51  0.65 0.77 (31.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.50            0.53  0.66 0.77 (32.) 
Practitioners 0.41            0.43  0.60 0.73 (33.) 
OLS 0.60 
Hamada 0.38            0.40  0.51 0.67 (34.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.41            0.43  0.53 0.69 (35.) 
Practitioners 0.32            0.33  0.47 0.65 (36.) 
2 years/ 
weekly 
Recent 
Sample 
Sum-Beta 0.53 
Hamada 0.33            0.35  0.44 0.63 (37.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.37            0.39  0.47 0.65 (38.) 
Practitioners 0.28            0.29  0.41 0.61 (39.) 
OLS 0.51 
Hamada 0.32            0.34  0.43 0.62 (40.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.36            0.38  0.45 0.63 (41.) 
Practitioners 0.27            0.28  0.40 0.60 (42.) 
Ex.non-
recurring 
events 
Sum-Beta 0.53 
Hamada 0.33            0.35  0.44 0.63 (43.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.37            0.39  0.47 0.65 (44.) 
Practitioners 0.28            0.29  0.41 0.61 (45.) 
OLS 0.55 
Hamada 0.35            0.37  0.47 0.64 (46.) 
Harris-Pringle 0.39            0.41  0.49 0.66 (47.) 
Practitioners 0.29            0.31  0.43 0.62 (48.) 
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7.2 RESULTS 
The estimated betas proved to provide the most explanatory power (i.e. highest R^2) with the lowest 
standard error using 2 months data of weekly returns (R² above 40% with S.E. below 3%). S&P 500 also 
proved to explain the relationship between the index and the stock best. This is no surprise, however, 
bearing in mind that Kraft Foods is both listed in the US where S&P500 is based as well as is part of the 
index. As a result, in line with the findings of Damodaran, betas regressed on a local index are higher 
than regressed on a global index.   
Out of those regressed using two months of weekly data with S&P 500, the most precise betas appeared 
to be those estimated excluding non-recurrent events from the sample. Both OLS and Sum-Beta yielded 
R²=0.48 with S.E.=0.028. Sum-Beta was slightly higher at 0.61 than OLS beta which was estimated to be 
0.59. 
The highest standard error with lowest R² was registered using unadjusted sample of recent 5 years of 
monthly returns (R²≈0.25 with S.E=0.053). 
Betas relevered using Harris-Pringle formula are higher than Hamada or Practitioner’s formula across 
the whole sample of 16 betas, while Practitioner’s formula have yielded the lowest relevered betas. This 
is an interesting contradicting observation to Grabowski’s argument that Practitioner’s formula treats 
the risk of realizing tax shields of interest payments higher than any other formula. Most obviously, it 
does depend whether the company is in a high or low beta industry as well as underleveraged or 
overleveraged. Figure 7.1 portrays the relationship between the beta relevered using different formulas 
and the deviation from the target capital structure assuming optimal debt-to-equity ratio of 0.5. One 
can notice that the patterns are quite different for a sample high beta and low beta firms. 
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FIGURE 7.1: DEVIATION FROM THE TARGET LEVERAGE AND RELEVERED BETA 
 
Turning back to the regression results, as you can see from the Figure 7.2, the betas obtain quite a high 
range of possible values. How does the choice of beta influence the cost of equity for Kraft Foods? You 
will find in the sensitivity table (Table 7.2) that the method of choice for calculating beta leads to cost of 
equity capital which varies by 1% depending on the choice of market risk premium used. The sensitivity 
table also provides a reference to the closest estimates of market risk premiums by academics and 
services. 
1% might seem marginal. However, our subject company operates in a low beta industry which reduces 
the range of possible regression betas as well as high standard errors. Furthermore, it is one of the 
largest companies in the world, therefore it experiences little trading delay or investor aversion for small 
size. For this reason, in our opinion, sum-betas do not yield results significantly different from OLS betas. 
Furthermore, given the size, company’s stock is quite correlated with both local and global index leading 
to similar regression estimates on local and global basis. 
Relevering methods contribute to an increased range of possible long term beta. Nonetheless, 
smoothing techniques partly correct for the differences in beta estimation methodologies. This is 
portrayed by a lower range of smoothed betas as compared to raw and relevered betas in Figure 7.2. 
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FIGURE 7.2: RANGE OF ESTIMATED BETAS 
 
What is the impact of beta calculations on the value of Kraft Foods? Let us look into it using 2 betas out 
of our sample of 48, and compare the differences in enterprise value of a company using simplifying 
assumptions. 
Let us assume we value a company using a beta obtained by regressing an unadjusted sample of 2 years 
of weekly returns on MSCI World Index. We then relever the beta to sector’s D/E ratio using 
Practitioner’s formula. This results in a relevered beta of 0.60 (Ref.no.42). Given the market risk 
premium of 4.50%, and risk free rate of 2.58%, we calculate cost of equity of 5.28% using CAPM: 
 
Further, we roughly estimate cost of debt from the BBB rating given to Kraft Foods: 
 
Assuming D/E ratio of 0.9 and no hybrid securities this gives us WACC of:  
 
On the other hand, using Sum-Beta of 5 year data sample of monthly excess returns without non-
recurring events relevered to target capital structure using Harris-Pringle formula (ref.nr. 8) ceteris 
paribus gives us WACC of 5.86%. Because free cash flow estimates of Kraft and Cadbury are not available 
on a consolidated basis, we establish a simple proxy to check sensitivity of enterprise value to WACC. Let 
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us assume a nominal growth for a company in consumer industry of 2% (slightly above average long-
term inflation) and free cash flow58 of $7bn. The resulting enterprise value using simple perpetuity 
growth model is: 
 
 
Although the actual free cash flow estimates are beyond the scope of this research, you can see how 
large the deviation in enterprise value can be just by using different betas. 
7.3 CONCLUSION 
Which is “the most righteous” beta out of the whole sample? If someone required a strict choice in 
between 48 different betas, we would quite obviously choose the one with the highest R^2 and lowest 
S.E. This would be S&P500 based Sum-Betas with weekly frequency and 2 years of sample data exclusive 
of non-recurrent events. We would prefer Harris-Pringle formula for relevering to target capital 
structure because it accounts for positive debt betas given BBB rating of Kraft’s stock. 
 Naturally, there is no single best estimate as well as single best methodology. In the preceding sections 
of the paper you will find a number of compelling arguments for using different methodologies. 
Furthermore, the topic is still under scrutiny of many academics. However, we believe that it is a good 
solution to check consensus as well as sector wide beta estimates before applying a single methodology. 
After all, it is the many opinions that make up the market and market is always (nearly) right.
                                                          
58
 This is just an arbitrary number from separate FCF estimates of Cadbury and Kraft ending FY2009. 
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TABLE 7.2: SENSITIVITY OF KRAFT FOOD’S COEC TO THE UNDERLYING INPUTS 
 
  
  
Damodaran 
geometric  
since 1967   
Damodaran 
arithmetic 
since 1967 
Damodaran 
geometric  
since 1928; 
SBBI 2008 
Yearbook  
since 1963; 
Credit Suisse 
since 1900 
ABN 
Amro/LBS 
geometric 
1900-2005 
Damodaran 
Implied 
ERP 
Damodaran 
arithmetic 
since 1928   
ABN Amro/ 
LBS 
arithmetic 
1900-2005   
  
Market Risk Premium 
Ref. Beta 3.00% 3.50% 4.00% 4.25% 4.50% 5.00% 5.50% 6.00% 6.50% 7.00% 
(42.) 0.60 4.38% 4.68% 4.98% 5.13% 5.28% 5.58% 5.88% 6.18% 6.48% 6.78% 
(30.) 
0.61 4.41% 4.72% 5.02% 5.17% 5.33% 5.63% 5.94% 6.24% 6.55% 6.85% (39.) 
(45.) 
(18.) 
0.62 4.44% 4.75% 5.06% 5.22% 5.37% 5.68% 5.99% 6.30% 6.61% 6.92% (40.) 
(48.) 
(28.) 
0.63 4.47% 4.79% 5.10% 5.26% 5.42% 5.73% 6.05% 6.36% 6.68% 6.99% (37.) (41.) 
(43.) 
(6.) 
0.64 4.50% 4.82% 5.14% 5.30% 5.46% 5.78% 6.10% 6.42% 6.74% 7.06% 
(15.) 
(16.) 
(21.) 
(46.) 
(24.) 
0.65 4.53% 4.86% 5.18% 5.34% 5.51% 5.83% 6.16% 6.48% 6.81% 7.13% 
(29.) 
(36.) 
(38.) 
(44.) 
(4.) 
0.66 4.56% 4.89% 5.22% 5.39% 5.55% 5.88% 6.21% 6.54% 6.87% 7.20% 
(13.) 
(17.) 
(19.) 
(47.) 
(27.) 0.67 4.59% 4.93% 5.26% 5.43% 5.60% 5.93% 6.27% 6.60% 6.94% 7.27% (34.) 
(5.) 
0.68 4.62% 4.96% 5.30% 5.47% 5.64% 5.98% 6.32% 6.66% 7.00% 7.34% 
(12.) 
(14.) 
(20.) 
(22.) 
(23.) 0.69 4.65% 5.00% 5.34% 5.51% 5.69% 6.03% 6.38% 6.72% 7.07% 7.41% (35.) 
(25.) 0.70 4.68% 5.03% 5.38% 5.56% 5.73% 6.08% 6.43% 6.78% 7.13% 7.48% 
(10.) 0.71 4.71% 5.07% 5.42% 5.60% 5.78% 6.13% 6.49% 6.84% 7.20% 7.55% (26.) 
(3.) 0.72 4.74% 5.10% 5.46% 5.64% 5.82% 6.18% 6.54% 6.90% 7.26% 7.62% (11.) 
(33.) 0.73 4.77% 5.14% 5.50% 5.68% 5.87% 6.23% 6.60% 6.96% 7.33% 7.69% 
(1.) 0.74 4.80% 5.17% 5.54% 5.73% 5.91% 6.28% 6.65% 7.02% 7.39% 7.76% 
(2.) 0.75 4.83% 5.21% 5.58% 5.77% 5.96% 6.33% 6.71% 7.08% 7.46% 7.83% 
(31.) 0.77 4.89% 5.28% 5.66% 5.85% 6.05% 6.43% 6.82% 7.20% 7.59% 7.97% (32.) 
(9.) 0.80 4.98% 5.38% 5.78% 5.98% 6.18% 6.58% 6.98% 7.38% 7.78% 8.18% 
(7.) 0.83 5.07% 5.49% 5.90% 6.11% 6.32% 6.73% 7.15% 7.56% 7.98% 8.39% 
(8.) 0.84 5.10% 5.52% 5.94% 6.15% 6.36% 6.78% 7.20% 7.62% 8.04% 8.46% 
 
0.68 Mean 
         
 
0.66 Median 
 
Yield on 10 year treasuries (1/9/2010) 
 
0.0258 
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8 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Cost of capital estimation posed with a challenge virtually everyone who tried to put it in a clear-cut 
framework, be it academics or corporate finance practitioners. Lack of widely accepted standards 
continues to make cost of capital as well as valuation an art. The paper attempts to establish guidelines, 
present with the caveats and uncover some of the biases related to cost of capital estimation. 
Since most of the biases arise in estimating cost of equity, the paper is largely focused on that part. Our 
recommendation on estimating beta can be summarized as follows: we suggest using Sum-Beta for 
obtaining raw beta from the regression. It is superior to OLS beta as it takes into account 
autocorrelations of a stock over 2 successive periods and reduces the downward bias arising from delay 
under which the market news are incorporated in the stock price. Consistent with the results of our 
research on Kraft Foods, we suggest using 104 weekly returns to populate the data sample. The sample 
should exclude non-recurring events influencing both the individual stock prices and the overall market 
prices. A larger adjusted sample size of 104 weekly returns (2 years) should lead to a lower standard 
error than 60 monthly returns (5 years) and reflect a more forward looking view of company’s 
systematic risks. One should consider, however, if using weekly frequency would not impede 
consistency with other inputs estimated on monthly basis. Furthermore, though ultra-high frequency 
betas provide promising methods of excluding market inefficiencies in beta estimates, we believe these 
betas still have a long way to go until they will gain credibility in corporate finance. Finally, if one is ready 
to dedicate more time to obtain higher beta precision, we recommend bottom-up /peer group 
approach. 
Our choice of relevering formula would be Harris-Pringle formula. It treats tax shields as if they tracked 
the risk of operating assets, accounts for positive debt betas and assumes that absolute amount of debt 
is fluctuating as company manages its capital to target levels, all being crucial to the distressed 
environment. 
When unlevering beta, one should use market D/E ratios (at least for the equity) as equity values are 
very likely to be eroded during bearish markets. Median target D/E ratios should be used to relever the 
beta as average values might bias a forward looking central value of industry D/E ratios, especially if the 
sample is large enough and contains outliers. 
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Unlevered betas should be adjusted for cash. As debt and equity values shrink in distressed environment 
cash might carry much higher value relative to the overall debt and equity. However, cash does not 
exhibit the same systematic risk as the operating assets. 
Despite the general preference among analysts of choosing a local index as a market proxy, we 
recommend to stick to a global index as it is much better diversified and less susceptible to volatilities in 
single constituents. Bearing in mind the number of assets contained in a global index such as MSCI 
World, it also matches the original definition of a market portfolio better under the CAPM. Our choice of 
risk-free rate would be ten year government treasury bonds with the lowest debt beta. These are US t-
bonds or the bonds of the most stable and mature countries. We would use 10 year bonds, preferably 
STRIPS or zero coupons. They provide the best trade-off between required duration, liquidity and 
reinvestment risk. However, if equity risk premium of choice is estimated using other long-term risk-free 
proxy, such as the 20-year bonds, to stay consistent, we would use to the latter. Further to that, we 
recommend choosing a market proxy which would be consistent with ERP as well. 
Though implied equity risk premium has become a well promoted method for estimating the extra 
reward required by the equity investors, we believe that it is too sensitive to inputs such as consensus 
estimates of future growth. One thing is hearing what analysts and traders have to say about where the 
market is going, yet another thing is seeing what they actually realize. We would rather stick to what 
they pay than what they say. However, implied equity risk premium is a good guideline tool for choosing 
among the variety of historical equity risk premiums estimated using different methods. 
Additional premiums should be added in the CAPM if necessary. We argue for the country risk premium 
and the small firm premium to be put in application since CAPM has failed to capture these extra risks as 
markets evolved over the last four decades. However, we suggest ignoring liquidity premium as it 
overlaps with the size premium, and does not bring in any consistency when valuing private firms. 
Furthermore, company specific premiums should not be applied as these idiosyncratic risks should be 
captured in the expected value of the future cashflows. 
In line with a general practice, when estimating cost of debt we suggest calculating promised yield to 
maturity of company’s debt or using yield spreads provided by the rating agencies. However, when it 
comes to estimating the cost of non-traded debt, one should consider estimating a synthetic rating 
based on multiple dimensions instead of a single ratio such as the interest-coverage ratio. 
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We would neither recommend an effective tax rate nor statutory tax rate for estimating after-tax cost of 
debt unless the company’s taxable income is beyond the highest taxable income bracket going forward. 
The tax rate at which the marginal income is taxed, hence the marginal tax, often lies in between the 
effective and statutory rate. Furthermore, statutory rates exhibit bubbles and might significantly 
overstate the actual marginal tax rate. Instead, we suggest using arbitrary tax rates based on company’s 
profitability, size and future prospects. Simulation models from the recent research provide some good 
insights on what these arbitrary marginal tax rates could be. 
We conclude our research by illustrating how the choices for estimating cost of equity influence the 
overall cost of capital in the case of Kraft Foods Inc. It is (not) surprising to find how large the range of 
possible estimates can be and how this could lead to differing enterprise values. Though the 
combination of choices lead to 48 different beta outputs, we reckon that just by including few extra 
options of target D/E ratio or sample size and frequency can lead to over 500 different estimates. Even 
tossing a coin would make it a time consuming way to choose among possible alternatives then.  
The paper attempted to establish clear-cut methods and rules for estimating cost of capital. However, 
we have stumbled upon certain inputs for cost of capital for which we found that further research was 
necessary. In particular, we believe that further research should contribute towards establishing 
stronger empirical evidence on the relationship between excess returns based on size and liquidity 
measures. Furthermore, now that consensus market growth estimates are available, future research 
should contribute towards analyzing the difference and the relationship between realized and implied 
equity premiums. Finally, relevant to our study, further research could aim to conclude on the best 
choices for beta estimates for a sample portfolio using realized returns and different historical equity 
risk premiums. 
All in all, WACC valuation can certainly be inferior to other methods such as APV when times are 
turbulent. However, bearing in mind that many analysts still use it during the periods of crises, different 
inputs of WACC are worthwhile paying attention to. One can, of course, always use solver to find WACC. 
Until then, we highly recommend being considerate when choosing a practical approach to calculating 
cost of capital. 
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APPENDIX  1 
 
 
Beta unlevering and relevering formulas 
 
Method Formula Explanation 
Hamada 
 
- levered/asset beta 
 – unlevered/equity beta 
 - beta of debt 
 - cost of debt prior to tax effect 
D – market value of debt capital 
E – market value of equity capital 
t – tax rate 
Milles-Ezzell 
 
Harris-Pringle 
 
Practitioner’s 
(modified Hamada) 
 
 
 
 
Service betas and their calculation methodology 
 
Service Time horizon Data frequency Adjustment Underlying index 
Alcar 5 years Monthly Bayesian S&P 500 
Barra Variable Monthy Barra risk model 
(forward looking) 
Variable 
Bloomberg Variable (2 year default) Variable (weekly default) Blume's Variable (S&P 500 default) 
Capital IQ Variable (2 year default) Weekly/Monthly None 8 domestic  
(S&P 500 default) 
Compustat 5 years Monthly None S&P 500 
Damodaran 5 years Monthly None Local (NYSE for US) 
Datastream 2⅟₂ years Monthly Bayesian Datastream total market 
Ibbotson 5 years Monthly Towards peer group, 
weighted by 
statistical significance 
S&P 500 
Merrill Lynch 5 years Monthly Bayesian* S&P 500 
Reuters 5 years (2 minimum) Monthly N/A S&P 500 
S&P 5 years Monthly None S&P 500 
Value Line 5 years Weekly Blume's** NYSE composite 
 
*Includes weighted average of unadjusted prior period betas 
**modified: 0.35+(0.67xunadjusted beta) 
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APPENDIX  2 
Companies Ranked by Market Value of Equity  
    Historical Equity Risk Premium: Average Since 1963 
    Data for Year Ending December  31, 2009 
    
         
Porfolio 
Rank 
By Size 
Aerage 
Mkt 
Value 
($mils.) 
Log 
of 
Size 
Beta 
(SumBeta) 
Since '63 
Arithmetics 
Average 
Return 
Arithmetic 
Average 
Risk 
Premium 
Indicated 
CAPM 
Premium 
Premium 
over 
CAPM 
Smoothed 
Premium 
over 
CAPM 
1 103,041 5.01 0.84 11.53% 4.57% 3.58% 0.99% -0.83% 
2 29,763 4.47 0.94 10.16% 3.20% 4.01% -0.80% 0.37% 
3 17,592 4.25 0.9 11.73% 4.77% 3.84% 0.92% 0.88% 
4 12,761 4.11 0.95 13.15% 6.19% 4.05% 2.14% 1.19% 
5 9,104 3.96 0.97 12.45% 5.49% 4.13% 1.36% 1.52% 
6 6,756 3.83 1.01 12.55% 5.59% 4.31% 1.28% 1.81% 
7 5,218 3.72 1 11.59% 4.63% 4.26% 0.36% 2.06% 
8 4,160 3.62 1.08 14.11% 7.15% 4.57% 2.58% 2.28% 
9 3,481 3.54 1.1 15.12% 8.16% 4.66% 3.50% 2.45% 
10 2,965 3.47 1.06 13.93% 6.97% 4.53% 2.44% 2.61% 
11 2,594 3.41 1.1 14.78% 7.82% 4.67% 3.14% 2.74% 
12 2,281 3.36 1.15 14.22% 7.26% 4.88% 2.37% 2.86% 
13 1,992 3.3 1.04 14.90% 7.94% 4.41% 3.53% 2.99% 
14 1,741 3.24 1.11 15.49% 8.53% 4.72% 3.81% 3.12% 
15 1,523 3.18 1.14 15.15% 8.19% 4.85% 3.34% 3.25% 
16 1,311 3.12 1.15 15.54% 8.58% 4.90% 3.68% 3.40% 
17 1,127 3.05 1.19 14.35% 7.39% 5.05% 2.34% 3.55% 
18 954 2.98 1.21 14.82% 7.86% 5.13% 2.73% 3.71% 
19 799 2.9 1.22 16.71% 9.75% 5.17% 4.58% 3.88% 
20 664 2.82 1.22 15.15% 8.19% 5.19% 3.00% 4.06% 
21 534 2.73 1.21 15.35% 8.39% 5.13% 3.26% 4.27% 
22 411 2.61 1.23 15.66% 8.70% 5.22% 3.48% 4.52% 
23 315 2.5 1.27 16.91% 9.95% 5.38% 4.57% 4.78% 
24 212 2.33 1.26 18.06% 11.10% 5.35% 5.75% 5.17% 
25 61 1.79 1.27 20.99% 14.03% 5.40% 8.63% 6.37% 
         Large Stocks (Ibbotson SBBI data) 11.21% 4.25% 
   Small Stocks (Ibbotson SBBI data) 16.22% 9.26% 
   
         Long-Term T-bonds (Ibbotson SBBI data)  6.96% 
    
         Source: Duff & Phelps Risk Premium Report 2010 
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